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Opening Remarks
Brian C. Rosenberg
I am pleased to welcome all of you to the first Macalester Civic 
Forum: Meditations on Global Citizenship; to welcome our distin-
guished guests, Professor Seyla Benhabib, Professor David Theo Gold-
berg, and Dr. Emmett Carson; to thank all of the faculty, students, and 
administrators who have agreed to participate in the events of this 
evening and the next few days; and especially to thank Dean Samatar, 
Associate Deans Andrew Latham and Karin Trail-Johnson, Margaret 
Beegle, and all the other members of the faculty, staff, and student 
body who have worked to bring this forum into being. Meaningful 
events of this sort do not just spring magically into existence. They are 
the products of labor—sometimes the labor of love, but labor nonethe-
less—and we who benefit should never forget to acknowledge those 
who have done the work.
I have been asked to help inaugurate this gathering by offering 
my own brief remarks on the meaning of global citizenship. This task 
is not a little daunting, partly because there are those in attendance 
whose academic and professional expertise positions them to address 
the topic of global citizenship with more grounding and context than 
I could hope to bring to my comments, and partly because I have been 
thinking and talking about global citizenship so often and for so long 
that I have begun to lose track of what I meant when I raised the sub-
ject in the first place, now nearly four years ago. Yet I will press on, 
and, to paraphrase E.M. Forster in Aspects of the Novel, will, I hope, 
begin to tell what I think when eventually I see what I say.
3
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The first point I would make this evening is that if the effort to 
establish the Institute for Global Citizenship is any indication, defin-
ing, understanding, and enacting global citizenship is among the most 
difficult work one can imagine. Without question it is the most diffi-
cult work I have ever done, and I say that as someone whose days are 
not typically filled with ease and the absence of contention. I believe 
the work to be difficult not because there is deep disagreement about 
the value of global citizenship or about its appropriateness at Macal-
ester College but because the phrase is so broad and the range of 
interpretations so wide that reaching meaningful consensus at times 
appears an impossibility. What could be more broad than the term 
“global”—unless one were to move to “extraterrestrial” or “galactic”—
and what could be subject to more varied readings than the concept of 
citizenship, which surely means very different things to, say, Macales-
ter alumnus Kofi Annan and to the vigilantes who patrol the southern 
borders of the United States? Understood in the loosest terms, every-
one on the planet is ineluctably a “global citizen,” yet understood in 
the strictest terms, very few of us rise in our personal behavior to the 
standards of true global citizenship. Finding a meaning precise enough 
to have relevance yet fluid enough to encompass a range of competing 
principles and priorities may be the first and greatest challenge of our 
work—work, I would add, in whose value and appropriateness and 
even necessity for Macalester my belief remains utterly unshaken.
I begin in thinking about global citizenship precisely where I begin 
in thinking about any abstract idea; that is, with its concrete manifesta-
tions. I believe that global citizenship has its roots not in how we treat 
others whose faces we never see, nor in how we imagine in the most 
general terms our responsibilities to others, but in how we treat, every 
day and in the most quotidian circumstances, the people around us. 
That is, global citizenship is at its core about humility, generosity, and 
the voluntary foregoing of self-interest. Two of my favorite authors 
make this point with an eloquence and precision to which I can only 
aspire. Near the end of Charles Dickens’s Hard Times, a reformed Mr. 
Gradgrind is pleading with Bitzer, a former pupil, to “disregard [his] 
present interest” and perform an act of kindness and grace. Bitzer is 
frankly puzzled, because, as everyone knows:
It was a fundamental principle of the Gradgrind philosophy that every-
thing was to be paid for. Nobody was ever on any account to give any-
body anything, or render anybody help without purchase. Gratitude 
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was to be abolished, and the virtues springing from it were not to be. 
Every inch of the existence of mankind, from birth to death, was to be a 
bargain across a counter. And if we didn’t get to Heaven that way, it was 
not a politico-economical place, and we had no business there.
Needless to say, the estimable Bitzer, for whom “the whole social sys-
tem is a question of self-interest,” remains unpersuaded by Gradgrind’s 
appeal to his humanity.
Stephen L. Carter, the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law 
at Yale and the author of works of theology, legal theory, philosophy, 
and fiction, makes a similar point with less irony but comparable force 
in his book On Civility. Among Carter’s central observations are the 
following:
Civility has two parts: generosity, even when it is costly, and trust, even 
when there is risk.
Civility creates not merely a negative duty not to do harm, but an affir-
mative duty to do good.
Civility requires that we express ourselves in ways that demonstrate our 
respect for others.
Civility requires resistance to the dominance of social life by the values 
of the marketplace. Thus, the basic principles of civility—generosity and 
trust—should apply as fully in the market and in politics as in every 
other human activity.
I believe that one could substitute the phrase “global citizenship” 
for the word “civility” in any of these statements and begin to work 
toward a useful definition of the concept. In other words, the way we 
understand our relationship and responsibilities to those with whom 
we interact daily go a long way toward defining our understanding 
of the ways we should interact with local, national, and international 
communities more broadly conceived.
I am at bottom a fairly simple (if not simple-minded) person with an 
abiding suspicion of the academic proclivity to overtheorize. Certainly 
I do not believe that the theory and practice of global citizenship ends 
with the embrace of such basic principles as generosity, trust, humility, 
and respect, but I do believe that any theory that does not begin with 
these principles, that is not rooted in them very deeply, is bound to be 
inadequate. How we treat the people around us, how we relate to the 
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communities within which we are embedded, stands as a synecdoche 
for how we are prepared to relate to the larger world.
I will end, finally, by reminding all of you how deeply discussions 
of this kind are embedded in the “DNA” of Macalester College. I have 
cited before, and will no doubt cite again, the column written by Macal-
ester President Charles Turck for the August 17, 1945, edition of the 
Mac Weekly in which he contends that, “the high task of every returning 
Macalester student and every new student is to prepare for the duties 
of world citizenship.” President Turck rightly acknowledged that this 
mission was not universally embraced by all colleges or all Americans 
and that, as he put it, “there may be parents who are reluctant to place 
their sons and daughters in an institution where the administration 
and faculty think and act, not in parochial terms, not even with a 
national bias, but in world terms.” There are no doubt such parents 
today, and perhaps some of their children are at Carleton. In any event, 
we cannot pretend that we are the first generation at Macalester to be 
having this conversation or that the fortunes of the college are easily 
disentangled from this commitment to thinking about our responsibili-
ties in global terms.
Turck’s most trenchant observation may have been the same one 
that I noted earlier in Dickens and Carter: the creation of global citi-
zens begins with the formation of individual character. “The vast scope 
of the world stage on which the present generation of students will live 
out their lives,” he wrote, sixty years before Thomas Friedman, “may 
suggest to some that personal qualities of character have become less 
significant. On the contrary, the individual is more important than ever. 
The more complex the social machine becomes, the more important it 
is that every individual have the moral and spiritual qualities to do his 
part. A world of peace means a world of peace-loving individuals.”
I would add, and conclude, by saying that a college of global citizens 
is not first and foremost one in which many students study abroad, or 
in which students hail from all parts of the country and the world, or 
in which students major in political science or international studies—
though all these things are good and important—but one in which the 
responsibilities of local citizenship are understood and embraced in 
all their complexity and with all their difficulties. To quote Stephen 
Carter once again, it is one that manifests that “generosity of spirit that 
assumes the best, not the worst, of the stranger.”
Thank you, and best of luck with the forum that commences here 
this evening. •
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Ahmed I. Samatar
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world;
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
  —William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming”
A topic such as the one discussed in this inaugural volume is at 
once intimidating and unavoidable—terrifying because of its weight 
and complexity; inescapable due to its heightened timeliness. To make 
even a modest contribution, then, average minds such as mine must 
press into service, even more than the usual practice, greater thinkers. 
In this spirit, I will start with Clifford Geertz. Reflecting on intimate 
encounters in contexts of acute diversity, he instructs us about the 
imperatives of mutual coexistence. “The next necessary thing…,” he 
declares in The Anthropologist as Author, “is to enlarge the possibility of 
intelligible discourses between people quite different from one another 
in interest, outlook, wealth and power, and yet contained in a world 
where, tumbled as they are into endless connection, it is increasingly 
difficult to get out of each other’s way.”1
I hold that Geertz is correct. Consequently, a preliminary definition 
of “Global Citizenship”—the emerging logos of our age—ought to start 
with a recognition of the dialectic of multiple differences that cannot be 
obliterated or wished out of existence, yet must co-evolve with each 
other. But perhaps one could dare to be a tad more adventuresome 
than Geertz. I suggest, therefore, that “Global Citizenship,” to respond 
effectively to both the ideational and concrete local and planetary chal-
lenges that confront us, may include the following: an extension of 
selfhood to belong to the human race without foregoing more local or 
regional affinities. Cosmopolitanism, then, is a fusion of immediate 
and transnational conceptions of self—a gateway to a revival of inclu-
7
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sive empathy; an identification of the problematique at a given time; 
a discerning analysis; and a common praxis towards desirable and 
achievable utopia. More on this a bit later but, for now, let me propose 
that the context of global citizenship, contrary to popular conceptions 
that strictly associate it with the rise of contemporary globalization, is 
both old and new.2
*****
In its oldest guise, the world as one starts with physical geography. 
Nearly 200 million years ago, all the present continents were part of 
one huge landmass that geologists named Pangea.
It stretched, writes the historian Alfred W. Crosby, over scores of degrees 
of latitude, and so we can assume that it had some variations in climate; 
but with only one landmass, there would not have been much variety 
among its life forms. One continent meant one arena for competition, 
and so only one set of winners in the Darwinian struggle for survival 
and reproduction. Reptiles, including all the dinosaurs, were the domi-
nant kinds of land animals in Pangea—and, therefore, the world—for 
three times as long as mammals have held that position since, and yet 
reptiles diversified into only two-thirds as many orders.
About 180 million years ago, Pangea began to break up like some 
immense tubular iceberg rotting in the heat of the Gulf Stream. First it 
split into two supercontinents, and then into smaller units that became, 
in time, the continents we know.3
Notwithstanding the cost/benefit impact of competition for space 
and resources for the continuation of life, Crosby reminds us of the spa-
tial, if not climatological, closeness of the material envelope of human 
existence. In other words, despite some local differences, the biosphere 
was one—a point that has taken us until the late 20th century to fully 
realize, and only after the rise of a set of serious global and regional 
environmental dangers.
In terms of human movement, archaeologists and anthropologists 
tell us that with the great break-up, Africa emerged as the oldest of the 
continents and the epicenter of the beginnings of human culture. Here, 
I proffer, lie both the origins of human life and constantly mutating 
adaptability. The import of this is twofold: (a) that at one time, though 
so long ago, we were one numerically tiny family in one place; and (b) 
that, if beginnings have durable significance, human beings became a 
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“global” species with that, now realized, migration from Africa to all 
corners of the planet. No wonder, then, that all religions simultane-
ously underscore the eschatological unity of humankind as well as the 
rich variability in interpretations and personal practice of faith.
It is an increasingly acknowledged fact that none of the specific 
human civilizations begot itself.4 Whether African, Indian, European, 
Chinese, Meso-American, or Middle Eastern, each fed on the energy 
of the others at one time or another. As Fernand Braudel asserted, on 
the contrary, each civilization is akin to “a railway goods yard”—one 
that thrives on exporting its own contributions and, at the same time, 
importing that of others. The balance of exportation and importation 
would, of course, vary with the specificity of the circumstances—
though some might propose that satiated civilizations are less keen on 
honoring the mutuality of exchange, let alone admit the fact that their 
own account might heavily depend on borrowings from others.
But, and to leapfrog, the project of modernity ushered in a massive 
and a new redrawing of many aspects of human life, including drastic 
displacements and replacements, and relations with nature. Some sug-
gested benchmark dates are 1490, 1492, and the “Long 16th Century.” 
For many, particularly in Europe, this was an opportunity to not only 
get away from dreaded situations but, more positively, to start all over 
again. Here, it is important to note that these adventures were sup-
ported by the combined naked force of the state and a raw appetite for 
private accumulation. The immediate consequences were dual clashes: 
(a) deadly competition among the contenders for material riches and 
power; and (b) on balance, utter devastation and conquest of native 
peoples.5 The piercing expression of Karl Marx captures the multidi-
mensional nature of the onslaught and the relentless forces at work:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement 
and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of 
conquest and looting of the East Indies…the hunting of black-skins, sig-
nalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic 
proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their 
heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe 
for a theatre.6
Increasingly, the shape of the world as one unit—one in which dis-
tant happenings had immediate local impact (and vice versa)—began 
to accelerate. Among the great issues was a rising concern over destruc-
9
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tive othering and exclusion. This worry led to renewed cosmopolitan 
yearnings such as those expressed in Immanuel Kant’s landmark essay, 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In these pages, Kant proposes 
that humankind can find lasting peace, “in a vast grave where all the 
horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried,” 
or, alternatively, humanity could attend to the problem of violence 
by transcending feral nationalistic politics. The latter would demand 
putting into place “a cosmopolitan ideal that is not only necessary for 
survival but also a requirement of practical reason.”7 In other words, 
the only option against aggressive divisiveness is the creation of a uni-
versal community of all peoples founded on reverence for personhood 
and governed by the application of just laws.
*****
In our epoch, globalization is at once compounding and making dis-
tinctive the contradictions associated with modernity. These great ten-
sions can be observed in some of the main spheres of human existence 
at the local, national, and transnational scales: relationship with nature; 
economic organization and livelihood; cultural encounters; and politi-
cal order—all in a context of what has been identified as compressed 
time and a reconfigured space. For the purposes of these notes and the 
theme of the proceedings, I bring forth four of the many critical pre-
dicaments that seem to be central to our time:
● War and peace8
If it is now part of our common sense that the disappearance of the 
hostile and armed division of the world into a nuclear-armed West and 
East is no more, both the threat of these lethal weapons in the nuclear 
states and the ambition of others to acquire them has not diminished. 
Russia, the core of the now defunct Soviet Union, and the United 
States, the heart of NATO, are both in possession of potentially devas-
tating warheads (25,000)—notwithstanding some initial quantitative 
reductions on both sides.9 Moreover, both countries, particularly the 
U.S.A. (at nearly $500 billion), continue to pour large sums into efforts 
to sustain their military postures. On the other side of the world, the 
Peoples Republic of China, enabled by its galloping economic growth, 
is accelerating the modernization and thickening of its military capabil-
ities. Hidden in this “quiet” arms race among these powers is an inten-
10
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sification of a search for advanced technological innovations, through 
more sophisticated robotization, that will minimize the deployment 
of human beings in the battlefields. Though a clash between major 
nuclear-armed countries is a quick way to Armageddon, it is the cost 
to human security of more conventional wars that continues to chal-
lenge us. In the last two decades in particular, bloody conflagrations 
or their impact within countries has claimed millions of lives. From the 
civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Algeria, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the Sudan, millions have been 
killed or died as a result of conditions induced by the wars. With easy 
acquisition of weapons in international markets and unconstrained by 
highly porous boundaries, internal strife fueled by a combination of 
material desperation in the midst of a visibly enticing but forbidden 
cornucopia, institutional decay, shrinking political arena, and contract-
ing identities, presents a Hobbesian conjuncture.
The rise of these internal wars does not mean an end to the ambi-
tion of the powerful state to intimidate or even invade the lesser ones.10 
None captures this dimension more vividly than the continuing war 
by the United States on Iraq. What only a few decades ago was one of 
the more successful countries in the Arab world to create a significant 
middle class (though accompanied by utterly violent political leader-
ship) is now reduced to sorrowful levels of generalized pauperism, 
intra-community blood-letting, and massive internal displacement, 
with many millions seeking refuge in neighboring countries and other 
parts of the world. The other war of this nature is the one raging in 
Afghanistan. First it was the then Soviet Union who sent its troops into 
the country to shore up a client regime; and now it is the United States, 
accompanied by NATO allies. It is important to note in the case of the 
latter, regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the subse-
quent discovery that those who masterminded this horror as well as 
other ghoulish acts against the United States were ensconced in bases 
in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the confluence of imperial arrogance and 
messianic hatred on the part of the disgruntled is an explosive cocktail. 
No matter its different guises, violence is antithetical to individual and 
“common” self. Here, then, we may remind ourselves of the sagacious 
voice of Erasmus of Rotterdam. In 1519, he wrote this: “Though other 
actions have their different disadvantages…war always brings about 
the wreck of everything that is good, and the tide of war overflows 
with everything that is worst; what is more, there is no evil that per-
sists so stubbornly.”11
11
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● Social Justice and Freedom
Among the crucial elements of social justice, none looms larger than 
the grip of poverty on hundreds of millions in many parts of the world. 
The rich societies of the North, including the United States, are not 
immune to this condition. As a matter of fact, in both rural areas and 
urban communities, deprivation, both relative and acute, is part of the 
human landscape. American inner cities and the suburbs of European 
metropolises such as Paris underscore this cruel reality.12
But it is in the societies beyond the core of the global system where 
social exclusion is most pronounced. Crystallizing in the growing 
“favela-zation” of urban living—one in which chronic hunger, disease, 
decrepit housing, violence, and toxic environment are the norm—social 
injustice is, for instance, a common feature in the Peoples Republic of 
China, India, Brazil, the Philippines, Peru, Haiti, Thailand, Mexico, 
Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. Moreover, the 
demise of the Soviet Union seems to have triggered the appearance 
and spreading sites of misery.
The fastest-growing slums are in the Russian Federation (especially ex-
‘Socialist company towns’ dependent on a single, now-closed industry) 
and the former Soviet republics, where urban dereliction has been bred 
at the same stomach-churning velocity as economic inequality and civic 
disinvestment. In 1993 the UN Urban Indicators Programme reported 
poverty rates of 80 percent or higher in both Baku…and Yerevan. Like-
wise, the concrete-and-steel Soviet-era urban core of Ulaanbaatar is now 
surrounded by a sea of 500,000 or more impoverished former pastoral-
ists living in tents…few of whom manage to eat more than once a day.13
Across geographies, the urgency for a fairer access to the necessary 
material and social means for a decent living is staring us in the face.14
To be sure, material sustenance is a precondition for human exis-
tence. Yet, as the familiar cliché has it, we don’t live by bread alone. 
Equally crucial is individual liberty, buttressed by legitimate proce-
dures. In this evolving global milieu, there are still huge numbers of 
people whose daily lives are punctuated by a mixture of repressive 
local structures and habits and distant, if not nefarious, international 
institutions. Again, there are few countries in the world where the 
opportunities to cultivate and then protect individual liberty are not 
an ongoing concern. The promotion of autonomy and self-restraint, in 
the context of constitutional governance, seems to be indispensable for 
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empowered local and global citizens willing to acknowledge difference 
and still trust in one another. Warning about the explosive potential of 
deferred expectations and denial of dignity, J.G. Herder left this note, 
more than two centuries ago:
To fail to make use of man’s divine and noble gifts, to allow these to rust 
and annihilate themselves, is not only an act of high-treason against 
humanity, but also the greatest damage that a state can inflict upon itself: 
for what is lost with such ‘dead’ and ‘buried’ assets is not merely the 
capital with interest; rather, since living forces do not let themselves be 
buried like dead capital, they fight back and among each other, and cre-
ate much confusion and disturbance for the commonwealth. A human 
being, whose capacities are suppressed and prevented from being used, 
cannot rest, simply because he is alive, and in his frustration he is likely 
to use his gifts for destructive ends in the most evil and hideous way.15
● Environment
Global warming is the latest and frightening evidence for the worsen-
ing state of the health of the biosphere.16 Yet the deterioration of our 
ecological home, through our cultural and technological impact, has 
been in progress for a significant stretch of time. Perhaps the sharpest 
warning in the last fifty years came from Rachel Carson.17 In that land-
mark volume, Carson sounded the alarm that, at least in the United 
States, air, water, and land had become subjected to reckless exploita-
tion through the use of chemical pesticides. Even more presciently, she 
linked the poisoning of rivers and lakes to grave dangers to human 
health. The great equatorial forests of Brazil, Central Africa, and South-
west Asia are under enormous pressures from logging to ranching, 
in the process shrinking the space for wildlife as well as diminishing 
the amount of oxygen available and adding more heat to the atmo-
sphere. Furthermore, desertification, or the receding of grasslands, is 
another item in the evolving environmental dangers, while coastal 
areas are being over-fished. Add to the above the mounting challenge 
of declining water tables, toxic waste, and air pollution, and it becomes 
plain that the degradation of the environment is one of the awesome 
dangers facing the human race. Few of the informed now doubt that 
a “death of nature” is tantamount to our own demise. In contrast, a 
new calibration, at the local and global levels, of environmental protec-
tion and human needs (and even some wants) seems the only way to 
13
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reverse the current and pernicious trends and, therefore, serve both the 
sustainability of the ecosystems and community well being.18
*****
If this new century is to become different from where we have been, 
then, we must think hard about what is to be done, particularly with 
an eye on the items identified above. Rising to such an obligation is 
already underway in many households and communities around the 
world. To carry the impulse forward, and at a most fundamental level, 
the old consciousness of species-belonging ought to be rehabilitated. 
Linking this state of mind to ethically grounded endeavors will make 
possible the building of new supra-intersubjectivity and interciviliza-
tional mutuality. In the pursuit of this large and difficult project, it is 
imperative to re-examine established perspectives—particularly that 
of the Left and the Right.
Among the provisions we need for this new journey, the Left’s stress 
on communitarian solidarity and social intimacy are precious. Demo-
cratic citizenship is unthinkable without such a credo and the insti-
tutions that give concreteness to it. But, we now know, after bitter 
experiences, that forced “community” and perverse conceptions of 
equality end up becoming an essentializing folly and a license for 
indulgences masquerading as “progressive” action. The ultimate cost 
is the erosion of thymos.
On the other hand, the Right’s emphasis on the preservation and 
enlargement of individual liberty, risk-taking, and the restraining of 
collective power is wise to appropriate. By the same token, the liabili-
ties of the Right to be avoided include self-seeking atomization. Put 
another way, in his Critique of Dialectical Reason, Jean-Paul Sartre cor-
rectly brings to our attention the syndrome of “inert gathering with 
its structure of seriality.” Sartre’s famous example is that of the bus 
queue. Notwithstanding the appearance of a social group, each is iso-
lated from the rest and, consequently, connected only by way of their 
alienation—the basis for what condemns them to their mutual alone-
ness. The upshot is that the merging of a self-possessed individual and 
hyper-consumerist culture is antithetical to the conduct of a common 
life—one in which the “self” and “other” commune.
A key mechanism to attend to the project of “global citizenship” 
is politics or the ordering of human associational life. Politics is to be 
understood as at once good and an unavoidable evil. The first points to 
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a moral exercise necessary for the creation and maintenance of a civi-
lized community; the latter reminds us of the presence of such vices 
as avarice, mendacity, and megalomania. Both Aristotle, in the first 
instance, and St. Augustine, in the second view, are instructive. Living 
in the midst of this contradiction, then, is a perpetual assignment, with 
stress on ethical thinking and living as a way to strengthen the spirit of 
personal and public goodness and diminish the seduction and destruc-
tiveness of self-serving or sectarian glory.19 A contemporary meditation 
on global citizenship, without completely overlooking the historical 
peculiarities of individuals, communities, cultures, and civilizations, 
cannot afford to underplay commonalities that defy differences. Two 
relevant insights from two remarkable world citizens, separated by 
millennia, still affirm our affinities: Diogenes the Cynic and Edward 
W. Said. In his prescient thinking, Diogenes construed “global citizen-
ship” as an eternal form of exile from the easy slippage into the orbit 
of local axioms, the reinforcing assurance of myopic attachments, and 
the intoxicating feeling that often accompanies self-importance and 
conceit in one’s own group. For Said, “Universality means taking a risk 
in order to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our back-
ground, language, nationality, which so often shield us from the reality 
of others.”20
Given the preceding, cultivating the identity of “global citizen” or 
“universal human,” in Martha Nussbaum’s conception, is a demand-
ing and endless task but one whose time has come. It is a remaking of 
both the self and the other in a multi-dialogical fashion. This requires 
attachment and detachment, individual responsibility and collective 
action—an exercise whose ultimate purpose is to create a global civic 
culture competent to treat the major issues of our age. Macalester Col-
lege’s awareness of this imperative is on record. In December 1943, the 
Macalester Weekly, our student body paper, printed this remarkable 
declaration:
The Mac Weekly editorial policy has been to strive toward better world 
citizenship among Macalester students, agreeing that the ultimate goal 
of education should be the establishing of a sound and just peace for all 
peoples.
These sentiments are notable because they fly in the face of a time in 
the United States when an aggressive nationalist fever was ascendant. 
Such farsightedness and courage are even more needed at this precari-
ous juncture in American and world history.21 •
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We are at the end of a long era, which can go by many names. One appropriate 
name could be the era of European universalism. We are moving into the era 
after that. One possible alternative is a multiplicity of universalisms that would 
resemble a network of universal universalisms. It would be the world of Seng-
hor’s rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir. There is no guarantee that we shall arrive 
there. This is the struggle of the coming twenty to fifty years. The only serious 
alternative is a new hierarchical, inegalitarian world that will claim to be based on 
universal values, but in which racism and sexism will continue to dominate our 
practices, quite possibly more viciously than in our existing world-system. So we 
must all simply persist in trying to analyze a world-system in its age of transition, 
in clarifying the alternatives available and thereby the moral choices we have to 
make, and finally, in illuminating the possible political paths we wish to choose.
Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power (New York: 
The New Press, 2006), p. 84.
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Global Citizenship and Responsibility
Diane Michelfelder
Let me start by thanking the organizers of this inaugural Macal-
ester Civic Forum as one of the initiatives of our new Institute for 
Global Citizenship, for putting together this session in particular, and 
for inviting me to take part in this exciting conversation and sharing of 
perspectives on the meaning of global citizenship. Such an occasion is 
an example of liberal arts learning at its best: an opportunity to look at 
the same phenomenon from multiple angles and points of view, and 
see what can spring forth as a result.
I must confess I initially thought the invitation to be a part of a 
forum whose explicit purpose was the collegial exchange of “medita-
tions on global citizenship” was perhaps extended to me by mistake. 
The word “meditations” brings with it the suggestive, philosophical 
ring of thoughts to oneself assembled in serenity and calm. In this 
light, a “meditative provost” is strikingly oxymoronic. What I have to 
offer here are perhaps less meditations in any traditional sense of the 
word than thoughts on the go. Still, I hope they will be intelligible and 
also reflect the probing seriousness that characterizes the spirit of this 
occasion.
Becoming a global citizen, as all of us know, does not happen by 
virtue of simply belonging to the world; rather, it is the result of active 
and sustained thought, energy, and effort. To be a citizen of a particu-
lar country frequently does not require any action on one’s part other 
than just “showing up,” being born to this or that set of parents in this 
or that set of specific circumstances. But global citizens are made, not 
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born. When we accept the identity of being a global citizen, we accept 
the responsibilities that are both complex in their nature and reflective 
of significant breadth of scope.
When we say that at Macalester we value the formation of global 
citizenship, we are saying in part that we value something whose for-
mation is directly linked to goods that are ethical in nature. Not every-
thing we hold as a valuable part of the student academic experience at 
Macalester has that explicit connection (for example, how to craft a log-
ical, intellectually penetrating, and eloquent essay). I would venture, 
however, that no matter what definition one gives to global citizenship 
with respect to its transcending or not transcending citizenship in tra-
ditional nation-states, the cultivation of a sense of responsibility is an 
elemental component of what it is all about.
How can we best take on the duties of shaping the student academic 
experience at Macalester in order to promote such a sense of responsi-
bility? I want to use most of my time here to focus on what Macalester’s 
commitment to fostering global citizenship might mean with respect to 
our sense of academic purpose, as well as to the shape of our academic 
structure and programming. I will, though, begin not with the local 
but with the global, with some observations about global citizenship in 
a fairly broad context of responsibility, and with the idea in mind that 
it is from this wider context that a foothold can be found for thinking 
about the question just raised.
From my perspective, a global citizen is someone who takes respon-
sibility for the health of the common good. A global citizen under-
stands responsibility as a form of stewardship—stewardship for what 
humanity shares, for what it holds in common, and on which it deeply 
depends. Perhaps the most obvious and transparent example of some-
thing in which we all share, hold in common, and on which we deeply 
depend is the environment. So, for example, the philosopher Peter 
Singer starts out his book One World by talking about the relationship 
between scientific causality and ethical responsibility in regard to the 
earth’s atmosphere. If the carbon emissions I produce as a result of my 
driving habits contribute to a condition that leads to floods that kill 
hundreds of people halfway around the world, the knowledge that I 
may have contributed to such a disaster ought to give me pause and 
lead me to make changes in how I get from the location where I am to 
the place where I want to be.1
This spring, Stavros Dimas, the environment commissioner for the 
European Union, called for speed limits to be placed on the remaining 
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6,000 or so kilometers of EU roadway that still lack them: the German 
autobahn. The German environment minister immediately objected to 
this suggestion, describing the approach to be “a trivialization” of the 
climate problem.2 Yet it could equally be said that Dimas’s approach 
is a way of optimizing individual responsibility for decreasing carbon 
emissions in particular and for protecting the environment in general. 
To consider the responsibility associated with global citizenship in 
this light amounts to defining responsibility along fairly straightfor-
ward and conventional lines. To put it another way, the causal “frame” 
within which I would weigh my responsibilities as a global citizen is 
really no different from the one in which I would weigh my responsi-
bilities as an ordinary citizen. If I do not pay the taxes I owe, everyone 
suffers. If I do not vote, my inaction might throw the election to the 
other candidate. Macalester College Environmental Studies major Tim-
othy Den Herder-Thomas asked in an essay in a recent student publi-
cation, why take my cell phone charger out of the wall when it is not 
in use?3 If I leave it in, I directly contribute to “standby power waste,” 
which worldwide makes up some 5–15% of all residential energy con-
sumption.4 If my doing “x” locally contributes to a devastating “y” 
on a global scale, then responsible ethical action implies I should do 
something different in order that “y” be lessened and ameliorated.
Let us now switch the scenario to consider another type of loss: the 
erosion of the world’s languages. Recently, the International Herald Tri-
bune reported there are now only eighteen native speakers remaining 
of Manchu, the prevailing language spoken during the Qing dynasty, 
whose existence spanned the period from the mid-17th century until 
the Republic of China was formed in 1911.5 All of its current native 
speakers are more than eighty years old. With 6.6 billion people in the 
world speaking nearly 6,900 languages, but with only 200 of these lan-
guages spoken by more than a million people, one can imagine many 
similar stories of irreversible loss to follow6—and to follow all too 
quickly, if the numerous predictions showing half of these languages 
disappearing by the end of this century are to be trusted.7
In an essay appearing in Frederic Jameson’s provocative volume 
Cultures of Globalization, Duke University professor Walter Mignolo 
(one of the featured speakers in our 2005 International Roundtable 
on Don Quixote) draws attention to the fact that of the twenty-five 
languages spoken by 75% of the world’s people, the number of people 
speaking non-colonial languages exceeds those speaking English and 
other colonizing languages.8 This is an intriguing point to consider 
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with respect to the currents of globalization, but for the moment I want 
to concentrate on the following question: As a global citizen, does a 
person have a responsibility to help prevent linguistic erosion on a 
global scale, just as he or she might have a responsibility to prevent 
environmental degradation on a global scale?
I, and probably many of you as well, would say yes. Just as we owe 
the environment our stewardship, we owe it to language as well, as lan-
guage is something humanity shares and on which it deeply depends. 
Linguistic diversity creates a kind of mulch, as it were, out of which 
new ideas and new perspectives can emerge; and as inheritors of the 
liberal arts tradition of education, it is particularly incumbent upon us 
to preserve multiplicities of perspectives. Still, it is difficult—perhaps 
not impossible but decidedly difficult—to draw out the responsibility 
in any kind of causal way that a person might have in this context. I 
can trace causal connections between energy usage, climate change, 
and human welfare, but it’s harder for me to draw causal connections 
between, on the one hand, my speaking English on this particular eve-
ning and, on the other hand, my contributing to the disappearance of 
Manchu or Scottish Gaelic or some other endangered language.
This leads me to consider the possibility that one characteristic of 
the responsibility associated with global citizenship is capaciousness. 
To be global citizens, we need to be capacious enough in our thinking 
to imagine common goods where they might not be self-evident. We 
must have a capacious sense of ethical responsibility in order to do our 
part in protecting and enhancing those goods where the causal link-
ages between what we do and their diminishment may not be easily 
traced.
Let me now approach this point about capacious responsibility from 
a different angle. Built into responsibility in this sense is a willingness 
to take risks. It is the willingness to refrain from quickly dismissing 
a people or particular individuals because of their beliefs or cultural 
practices, to extricate ourselves from the familiarity of our own com-
fort zones, and to accept responsibilities toward strangers as well as 
toward those with whom we share our lives in more intimate ways. 
Additionally, the more informed we are, the more we may grow in our 
adeptness to assume risk, capacious responsibility, and the attitude of 
global citizenship.
In One World, Peter Singer mentions the well-known essay by the 
philosopher Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in 
which Williams cautions us in addressing ethical questions not to have 
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what he called, “one thought too many.”9 Suppose you as my neighbor 
or friend are in need of a ride to the airport, which I offer to provide. 
Williams argues I do not need any justification for why my action 
is the right thing to do beyond pointing to the facts that you are my 
friend or neighbor and that I bear you some affection. If, however, 
I justify what I am doing by noting our friendship and adding that 
when I give preferential treatment to my friends I end up bringing 
more good into the world than when I don’t, Singer would wonder if I 
am not “overthinking” the situation. But from the perspective of good 
global citizenship, an additional thought such as this one is necessary, 
for the very reason that it might not be additional at all but rather the 
only justification at one’s disposal. Without an impartial justification 
at hand, something like respect for fellow citizens as members of a 
global community, I may not be motivated at all to act responsively for 
the sake of strangers. But to claim that “we are all in this together” or, 
perhaps more elegantly, that we are all fellow citizens in an interde-
pendent global community, may in many situations be a fairly “thin” 
and consequently ineffective justification for helping to improve the 
literacy rates of women worldwide, for example, or otherwise better 
the conditions of those living in dire situations. The more context, the 
more knowledge and information I have, the more I might be pro-
pelled toward not only seeing a complex ethical dilemma reflected in 
a particular situation but also adjusting what I do in the course of my 
everyday activities to respond to it. Context can help to turn the notion 
of a human community from an abstract concept into a more concrete 
notion, and can provide greater traction for responsible action than 
abstract ethical principles alone.
With this as a backdrop, let me now turn to the question, “What 
would a Macalester College that was fully ‘encultured’ with the goal of 
helping prepare students to be global citizens look like?” In particular, 
what would it look like with respect to academic programs and the 
structures that animate and support them?
I do not see any need for us to make global changes to promote 
global citizenship. The history and mission that give form to the vibrant 
identity of Macalester College render unnecessary a radical revamping 
of our academic priorities. I do, though, see numerous opportunities 
for change that would enhance both academic community and aca-
demic inquiry while at the same time leading to what we could call 
an intellectually sustainable environment for the promotion of global 
citizenship.
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First of all, helping students achieve the understanding that pro-
vides the traction for responsible action as a global citizen is arguably 
the provenance of all academic departments within the College. We 
need to continue to pay particular attention to the cultivation of criti-
cal thinking, quantitative reasoning, and the understanding of issues 
related to race, gender, and class. We must encourage fluency in at least 
one language other than English, knowledge of the world’s religious 
traditions, scientific understanding, geographic literacy, and what is 
now being called critical information literacy (understood not only as 
the acquisition of the ability to separate good online information from 
bad, but also as the strengthening of the will to seek out information 
on websites or blogs so that you get to meet up with what is other and 
very unfamiliar).
As a lead-in for my next point, I’d like to turn to a passage taken 
from a talk given by Robert Weisbuch at the 2005 annual meeting of 
the American Council of Learned Societies but originating in David 
Damrosch’s book, We Scholars:
Too often, American scholars still hold fast to a hermeneutics of exile, 
using their specialized knowledge to dwell in a distant time within an 
esoteric disciplinary space, returning periodically like Rip Van Winkle 
from his inaccessible mountain retreat. We scholars rightly cherish our 
independence of mind and our originality of concept, but we need to 
balance the hermeneutics of exile with a more creative hermeneutics of 
community.10
There are many good signs at Macalester that the creative herme-
neutics of community is flourishing with respect to the kind of com-
munity Damrosch had in mind, including the Urban Faculty Seminar 
and courses resulting from it, such as the History Department’s “The 
Global in the Local,” the Lake Street Project, this spring’s Environmen-
tal Studies senior seminar in which students are getting experience 
writing grant proposals for the new EcoHouse, and so forth. Yet for us 
to fully invest ourselves in supporting global citizenship as a student 
learning outcome and as a subject of academic inquiry and reflec-
tion—with regard to both public scholarship and its more traditional 
forms—we need to be able to engender a more creative hermeneutics 
of community within Macalester College itself.
The physical layout of academic space at Macalester does not easily 
lend itself to the smooth circulation of creative ideas and the formation 
of programs that cross disciplinary lines. Seen from a geographical/
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political science perspective, our academic structure is rather akin to a 
collection of nation-states. We are certainly not unlike many other lib-
eral arts colleges in this regard, but without sacrificing the importance 
of department- or division-based place, we need to act more transna-
tionally, as it were, if we are to build superlative programs supportive 
of scholarly inquiry related to global issues. There are certainly such 
promising programs in various stages of development and conversa-
tion on campus—the Fellows program in global citizenship and lead-
ership connected to the Institute, and a concentration in community 
and public health and another in human rights and humanitarian-
ism, to name three. These potential programs represent a good deal of 
appealing “traction” for the development of responsible global citizen-
ship among our students. While it will be challenging, I hope we will 
be able to advance all of these good ideas beyond the planning stages.
Along with this, it would be good to think of what we could do to 
take a more “global in the local” perspective here “in house.” Recently 
in Chicago I had the pleasure of attending a symposium at the Ameri-
can Chemical Society meeting in recognition of Professor Emeritus 
Truman Schwartz, the 2007 recipient of the George C. Pimentel Award 
in Chemistry Education, and to hear Truman talk about his experi-
ence as a practitioner of the liberal art of Chemistry. It meant not only 
assigning students readings by chemists, for instance, but also asking 
them to discuss how the Second Law of Thermodynamics is involved 
in Shakespeare’s plays.11 The more imaginative work of this sort that 
we can do, the more our students’ minds are primed for the big-picture 
thinking that global citizenship demands.
Another closely connected question is how to have more hospita-
ble physical spaces for curricular and co-curricular programming that 
facilitate cross-disciplinary inquiry. In this regard, I believe the pro-
posed Institute for Global Citizenship building is an exemplary step 
toward creating a place that can be both an intellectual commons for 
many faculty at Macalester as well as a space to bring our own com-
munity together with the larger community of which we are a part.
Finally, and to return to the idea of meditation with which these 
thoughts began, we live in a time marked not only by the scale of the 
global, but by great variety of scale, from the global to the “nano.” 
With the latter scale in mind, I am mindful that this is also a time 
when our attention is easily, even rapidly, deflected from one thing to 
the next. In the years to come we will need to find some way to build 
greater capacity within our students for sustained or capacious (to use 
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that word again) attentiveness, which is a prerequisite, much like criti-
cal thinking or other skills we aim to cultivate as part of a liberal arts 
education, for effective and ethical global citizenship.
Let me close with this observation. Both the process of inspiring 
others to become global citizens and the process of becoming one one-
self require intellectual reach and stamina. Assisting our students to 
develop the intellectual wherewithal, the nuanced judgment, and the 
will to live lives of global citizenship is work that takes much imagina-
tion, collective engagement, and focus. It is, though, critical work to 
do. I am confident that as we take it up, those who will come after us 
will look back upon it and see it reflective of the integrity, distinctive-
ness, and exceptionality that characterize so much of what Macalester 
faculty, staff, and students do. But until we get to this point, as Andrew 
Latham said, let the open-ended conversation about global citizenship 
begin! •
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Race Matters
Jane Rhodes
I welcome the opportunity to offer my musings on the concept of 
global citizenship that this occasion demands. First, let me acknowl-
edge Cornell West’s important study, whose name I’ve appropriated 
for this talk.1 As we embark on the creation of the Institute for Global 
Citizenship, we need to unpack the language embedded in this project. 
In particular, what does global mean? Clearly, it suggests the disman-
tling of older, outmoded categories that juxtapose domestic and foreign. 
The term global also references the reality that traditional borders of 
the nation-state no longer have the same salience. Borders are perme-
able and constantly crossed by bodies, by products and commerce, 
by words and images. Ironically, at the same time that the notion of 
national borders has been called into question, here in the United 
States we live in a political climate that calls for renewed allegiances, 
resurgent patriotism, and the clinging to a national identity. Indeed, as 
many scholars have noted in the wake of 9/11, the mechanisms for the 
production of American nationalism (political discourse, laws, media, 
and cultural practices among them) have grown exponentially. Multi-
culturalism—that amorphous, ambiguous, and contentious term—has 
been used to this end. If jingoism and hyper-nationalism are character-
ized as an “us against them” mentality, multiculturalism has served to 
enlarge the concept of who is included within these formations. Multi-
culturalism has encouraged new categories of American identities and 
the recognition and celebration of these identities. You can be black, 
brown, mixed-race, immigrant, or native-born and simultaneously 
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American, but only if you are not located within a grouping associ-
ated with the “enemy”—Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, Third 
World fundamentalist, radical. Racial, ethnic, religious, social, and cul-
tural differences can be embraced within our collective acknowledge-
ment of common interests, or so it seems.
The contemporary moment brings with it enormous tensions 
around America’s global economic influence and the national political 
impulses that seek to reify an authentic American identity. Hence we 
must consider the other part of this enterprise at Macalester College: 
citizenship. While this era of globalization destabilizes the notion of citi-
zenship, we are also situated within a political and social environment 
in which being a citizen has become the political lynchpin that defines 
who is one of us and who is the other; who is entitled to the rights of 
citizenship, and who is not. Like multiculturalism, citizenship is an 
ever-changing, politically contested term that can determine one’s life 
chances. It also becomes the framework through which the privileged 
may feel emboldened to deny those privileges to the disadvantaged. Is 
the undocumented immigrant worker from Mexico, Russia, or China, 
who cleans our houses, mows our lawns, and takes care of our chil-
dren (and whom we pay under the table), less entitled to becoming a 
citizen? Should those individuals without legal status suffer in an exilic 
netherworld while they pay taxes, contribute to our GNP, and uphold 
our dearest principles of thrift and industry? Thus, when hundreds of 
thousands of Latino/a immigrants and their allies demonstrated across 
the country in spring 2006 to assert their rights in the face of a wave of 
anti-immigrant sentiment, they asserted their citizenship and service 
to the nation as a sign of entitlement. But, if we are truly embracing 
the idea of global citizenship, why should their immigration status mat-
ter? That Latinos/as, who are fast becoming the backbone of America’s 
service and professional classes, are still seen as foreign, demonized by 
nativism and xenophobia, and considered an economic threat rather 
than an economic boon, unveils this dilemma.
I would argue that race in America is the overarching factor that 
calls the national identity of many, but not all, global subjects into 
question. Race matters. America is caught between its racial past and 
global present, a paradox that further complicates our already troubled 
intercultural relationships. Is the Mexican-American man who works 
as a janitor at the Macalester College Alumni House more or less a citi-
zen after living in the United States for thirty years? If he were “white,” 
would we so easily question his credentials for citizenship? It is his skin 
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color, the certain familiarity of his cultural cues, and his accent that 
conflate his racial difference with the status of national outsider. He is 
coded not only as racially different but as an alien invader, although he 
is a citizen. These representations have been underscored by more than 
150 years (since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo) of legal wrangling, 
political rhetoric, and racist invective that reflect Americans’ profound 
anxieties about being overrun by those south of our national border. 
When I first arrived at the Macalester College campus, we had a long 
chat during which the janitor told me how he crossed the border as a 
young man and toiled in southern California until he learned of work 
opportunities in Minnesota. After making the cross-country trek, he 
was delighted to find a multigenerational Mexican-American commu-
nity in the Twin Cities, where he decided to settle. The Alumni House 
worker is an example of a global citizen, yet many would deny him the 
category of American citizen and all that that implies because he also 
belongs to a category—Mexican—that has embedded in it the idea of 
someone who must be kept out.
Recently, political scientist Wendy Brown, in a lecture at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, talked about the contradictions presented as new 
walls go up around the world in an era of “porous sovereignty.” In 
particular, she pointed to the U.S.-Mexico border and asked, “Why 
the proliferation of physical walls in an ostensibly globally connected 
world?”2 That our borders need to be under surveillance in the danger-
ous world of clandestine warfare makes sense. That we are obsessed 
with our southern border, the entry point for immigrants from Mexico, 
Central America, Brazil, Haiti, and China, among other locales, sug-
gests that the border’s function has more to do with policing certain 
“racial” groups than it does with keeping the nation safe from harm. 
Indeed, these dual projects become the same.
Race matters. And darker skin often—but not always—matters. Race 
can be a stand-in for the other or for some linked category of difference. 
Members who share a religious identity, Muslim or Jew, can and have 
been called a race. Individuals who share a culture or historical or lin-
guistic background, such as gypsies, have been referred to as a race. I 
am not arguing for any biological determinism, but rather for the ways 
that race haunts our consciousness, our sense of identity, and our ideas 
of nation and sovereignty. I want to suggest that despite the wide-
spread celebration of the flow of global capital and de-territorialization 
as a process that breaks down barriers and opens up opportunities, 
the era of globalization has within it a backlash culture, in which racial 
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ideologies allow us to keep ourselves separate and apart from those we 
perceive to be a threat. Global media has played a significant role in 
disseminating racial ideas. How many people born outside of the U.S. 
have formed ideas about African Americans, Native Americans, and 
Latinos based on the repetition of images they consume in film and 
television? Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai explicitly links media and 
migration as embodiments of the global flow that governs contempo-
rary life. He notes that media offers new resources and new disciplines 
for the construction of imagined selves and imagined worlds. Potential 
migrants use the media to rearticulate who they are and to prepare 
themselves for the world they encounter.3
Race matters in all aspects of global politics. Let us look at the Afri-
can slave trade, which is a starting point for making Britain and the 
United States global empires. In 2007, the United Kingdom marked the 
bicentennial of the abolition of the slave trade through a wide array 
of exhibits and programs. This has sparked considerable controversy 
because some of the observances have highlighted the British abo-
litionist movement and celebrated the fact that slavery ended there 
some twenty-five years before it did in the United States. Some critics 
of Britain’s commemoration point out that the anniversary makes it 
appear that white people liberated black; that British abolitionists were 
the heroes of the struggle against slavery. This slant reinforces the idea 
of African dependency on whites and the Western civilization that 
rationalized slavery in the first place. In reality, slaves rose against the 
trade from its inception, and the specter of rebellions led by Toussaint 
L’Ouverture in Haiti or Nat Turner in Virginia inflamed whites’ fears 
of black insurrection.
By 1820, more than ten million Africans had been transported across 
the Atlantic. Some estimates suggest two million or more died in tran-
sit. The British have debated whether this early global trade in bodies 
warrants an apology from its leaders. Meanwhile, British educational 
and cultural institutions have insisted that this episode in the nation’s 
history be recognized and interrogated. More than two hundred years 
since the slave trade, issues of race and citizenship continue to plague 
the United States and Britain, a direct legacy of the “peculiar insti-
tution.” Global formations shaped the African-American freedom 
struggles of the mid-twentieth century, for example. Black Americans 
became increasingly cognizant that their efforts to overthrow legal, 
social, and political discrimination were echoed in anti-colonial strug-
gles around the world. From the 1930s, figures like Paul Robeson and 
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W.E.B. DuBois were central members of the Council of African Affairs, 
and in the 1960s, African-American activists met their counterparts in 
Bandung, Indonesia, to demonstrate their solidarity with global free-
dom movements. The abolition of the slave trade was not only a Brit-
ish phenomenon; it included the United States as its main traditional 
partner. Yet there is little national introspection here about the national 
complicity in slavery, as there has been in Britain. Instead, many Amer-
icans claim to be weary of references to slavery and have dismissed 
demands for reparations. Yet data makes it clear that the legacy of slav-
ery in the United States remains profound. This is starkly represented 
by the disparities in the criminal justice system.
According to a 2006 report by the American Civil Liberties Union, 
African Americans make up an estimated 15% of drug users, but they 
account for 37% of those arrested on drug charges, 59% of those con-
victed, and 74% of all drug offenders sentenced to prison. While politi-
cians and social scientists debate how to interpret these trends, most 
agree that race is a factor in these differences. The U.S. has 260,000 peo-
ple in state prisons on nonviolent drug charges and 183,200 (more than 
70%) are black or Latino. Overall, while African Americans comprise 
12% of the total population, they are 50% of the jail and prison popu-
lation. This is one million black men and women whose life chances 
have been profoundly altered and circumscribed. It is more likely that 
a black person of college age is in prison than in school. Despite the 
national resistance to affirmative action programs and other strate-
gies that have been derisively called “reverse discrimination,” there 
are no economic indicators showing a black advantage. Black median 
income is significantly less than whites’ while black poverty rates are 
higher. Black unemployment rates are typically double white rates. 
For example, on average, black workers with the same education, the 
same experience, working in the same industry, and living in the same 
region of the country as whites still earn less money. Race clearly mat-
ters.
These racial inequalities reflect the dual forces of economic disad-
vantage and institutional discrimination. A common argument made 
by whites is that there has been more than enough time for blacks to 
catch up with whites economically because more than 150 years have 
passed since the end of slavery. However, economists have shown that 
economic (dis)advantages are inherited across generations. As econo-
mist Austan Goolsbee puts it, “The recent evidence shows quite clearly 
that in today’s economy starting at the bottom is a recipe for being 
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underpaid for a long time to come.” The processes of social mobility 
that have made it possible for earlier generations of European immi-
grants to succeed are dramatically slower for descendants of slaves. A 
substantial body of research finds that at least 45% of parents’ advan-
tage in income is passed along to their children, and perhaps as much 
as 60%. If your great-great-grandfather was a slave or the child of 
former slaves, the opportunity to catch up is daunting. Indeed, rather 
than viewing the black underclass as morally deficient, we should 
acknowledge that the modest achievements of the black middle class 
are remarkable.4
Race in America matters: it is a primary determinant of life chances. 
Yet the current vogue is to deny that race matters and to suggest that 
we live in a post-racial, color-blind culture. No one embodies this 
more than Senator Barack Obama, who seeks to craft himself as the 
ideal global citizen. As most of you know, Senator Obama claims a 
mixed race, transnational identity—with black and white parentage 
and an upbringing in Hawaii and Indonesia. I have been fascinated 
by Obama’s political strategy to distance himself from the baby-boom 
generation by arguing that the issues that divided America in the twen-
tieth century—race, class, and gender among them—should be tran-
scended with a new political vision. I view this with great irony since 
Mr. Obama trades on the very racial terrain that he seeks to avoid. 
When he announced his candidacy, none of the national news media 
seemed to remember that he was mixed race as they openly wondered 
whether he could be the First Black President. Senator Obama offers 
us the classic racial paradox; no matter what you may call yourself, 
what matters is how others see you and define you. This was most elo-
quently captured by W.E.B. DuBois in his essay The Souls of Black Folk, 
when he wrote that black Americans endure, “this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul 
by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”5
Race has no biological relevance when considering Senator Obama’s 
identity, but it has everything to do with whether or not he will become 
the next President of the United States. In his memoirs, Obama recalled 
that he felt his status as a global citizen left him ill prepared for the 
politics of race as they are played out in the United States. He talks 
about being overwhelmed by racist comments from high school class-
mates and he was forced to tolerate a coach who called black oppo-
nents “niggers.” “I kept finding the same anguish, the same doubt, a 
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self-contempt that neither irony not intellect seemed able to deflect,” 
he wrote.6
As I close, I want to suggest that we not take the concept of global 
citizenship blithely; that we not embrace it as a marker for multicul-
tural “progress” on a world stage. Rather, we need to remember that 
race, ethnicity, and other categories of difference have not disappeared; 
they stubbornly remain embedded in history, politics, and culture. 
Race still matters. •
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Vocation of the Institute for Global 
Citizenship: An Undivided Life
The Rev. Dr. Lucy Forster-Smith
In my thirteen years as Chaplain of Macalester College I have 
been privileged to serve this community of scholars, students, staff, 
and alumni as we seek to educate the bright lights on the horizon of 
the future of our planet. Much of our work in this place has to do with 
bridging. We are in the business of bridge building—between academ-
ics and the co-curricular, between men and women, gay and straight 
and transgendered, between faculty and staff, between physical and 
emotional health, between our local context and the global arena, 
and between personal and public, to name a few. The act of building 
bridges and then the consequent act of walking across those bridges 
and engaging the world on the other side is in large measure what a 
liberal arts education is about. But in some ways the metaphor strains 
at this time on planet earth because it assumes that there is one side 
and the other side, and we often pay little attention to the chasm, the 
barrier, the river, the adversary, over which the bridge is built. It also 
strains because residing on one side of the bridge or the other keeps us 
separated from the side we have left, and places limits on our perspec-
tive with the deterministic positioning.
I thought of this bridging metaphor when I participated a few weeks 
ago with a group of Macalester seniors in a ropes course during our 
Lilly Senior Leadership Conference out on Whidbey Island in the Puget 
Sound. For those of you that don’t know ropes courses, they are set up 
as a series of challenges for a group to overcome in order to accomplish 
a set goal. In the particular challenge given to our group that day, we 
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were to navigate a series of steel cables that were about three feet off 
the ground, ranging in length from eight to twenty-five feet. These 
cables were strung between trees. The challenge was to get the group 
to the end of the course and if anyone fell off they had to start over 
again. Accomplishing this task took strategy, some coordination, and a 
lot of communication. But what was absolutely true about the experi-
ence was not the thought-out strategy at the beginning or the sense of 
accomplishment at the end, but the clear sense of commitment that we 
were all in it together and every person involved brought a particular 
gift or skill to the course that no one else in that circle of seniors and 
two staff people could replicate. It wasn’t the physics of the course or 
the foreknowledge that one or another of us had about the mechanics 
of a ropes course that was most important, but paying attention and 
discovering what each person brought to the task at hand. There was 
a hidden wholeness in the group that was brought to light as we made 
our way across the wobbly cables, linking hands, sturdying the timid, 
experimenting, and trying out new ways of thinking and processing.
One of the contributions the Institute for Global Citizenship must 
make at Macalester College is bridging and exposing the hidden 
wholeness in our institution. We live fragmented lives. Not only in our 
personal lives but also in our nation’s common life, we are increasingly 
polarized and our world increasingly perilous. There is much pres-
sure on the planet to divide things up between good and evil, between 
the haves and have-nots, between religious and secular, powerful and 
powerless—one side of the bridge or the other. The critical function of 
our Institute for Global Citizenship is to focus not only on the prob-
lems of our time but to summon our students and every member of 
this community to realize the hidden connection among all of our 
worlds, and in that realization recognize that seeing the world in an 
undivided way may lead to discomfort and a lack of certainty about 
any of our individual contributions. Dianna Chapman Walsh, Presi-
dent of Wellesley College, in a lecture given at the Institute for College 
Student Values, says, “It is summoning the discipline to focus atten-
tion in all directions that causes discomfort, facing moral dilemmas in 
all their complexity. It is seeing past the self-interest…and cultivating 
the imagination and the generosity of spirit—in ourselves and those 
we touch—to focus on wrenching problems and yet not to lose heart, 
to open our hearts to sorrow without being paralyzed, to find in the 
world’s suffering our bonds of humanity.”1
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The question that arises in the midst of this is how can we best 
prepare and support our students in becoming passionate and coura-
geous participants in the world, and who also live undivided lives? 
My answer to that question is that we live an undivided life in this 
place, Macalester College, March 29, 2007, and beyond. This is not a 
new thought. As a matter of fact, it is at the core of our college’s found-
ing. Have you ever really looked at the college seal? There it is, the 
undivided life: Two women, scantily clad, holding the symbols of late 
19th-century enlightenment educational context. In the hand of one, 
the telescope, in the hand of the other, the open Bible, and a compass at 
their feet—Nature and Revelation, the heavenly twins. Edward Duff-
ield Neill comments on this seal:
The trustees of Macalester College, believing in the harmony of nature 
and revelation, have engraved on their corporate seal two figures; one 
in loose, classic drapery, standing with telescope in hand, and compass 
at the feet, representing science investigating the laws of nature; the 
other, in sitting posture, clad in modest robes, holding open the Word 
of God, representing revelation. Both are in friendly converse, twin sis-
ters of heaven, as the motto suggests. ‘Natura et revelato coeli Gemini.’ 
The object of the American College is not to promote an aesthetic or a 
medieval culture. It recognizes that the life of a young man from sixteen 
to twenty-one years of age is most critical and susceptible. Its aim is to 
develop harmoniously the body, the intellect and the affections.”2
I think it is our students who are asking for an integrated life. The 
pressure on students today to prepare for and at the same time live 
their life on this globe is unbelievable. If our goal is to send from our 
midst citizen leaders who are going to have cultural fluency, intellec-
tual curiosity for life-long learning, great relationships with partners, 
friends, and their own children, and a willingness to take risks in the 
pursuit of harmony, then we must open the way for this college and 
community to be a laboratory for effective action and deep, honest 
reflection, not only of the impact of our actions but of the motivations 
and informants of that engagement. We must take seriously our lives 
as moral agents, bringing into close contact the knower and the known, 
our inner life and what we are discovering in the outside world. What 
we are engaging is how the story of our lives informs the way we 
approach academic study. But this also includes how we play rugby on 
the lawn, how we party with one another, and how we engage in the 
conversations we have in advising appointments or with a colleague at 
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Old Main. In other words, the deepest engagement of the Institute for 
Global Citizenship is to bridge the world “in here” with the world “out 
there.” I not only mean a bridge from the Macalester “bubble” to the 
“world,” but the inner sanctum of our full life as citizens of this com-
munity, Macalester College, and the frontier of the human soul and 
imagination.
I don’t think it is any coincidence that many of the endeavors that 
are associated with the Institute for Global Citizenship are at their core 
reaching for an integrated life.
•  The Civic Engagement Center’s legacy at Macalester is one of 
engagement with our neighborhood and community that takes the 
inner life of commitment to the world and seals that with a mutual 
vulnerability with the populations or causes one serves. The ethic of 
service is one of care for the other and opening the way to learn more 
in the engagement than one would ever hope to impart.
•  The Lilly Project has at its core the big questions of the meaning and 
purpose of one’s life and how a person can live out dreams, hopes, 
and longings that drive us to contribute to the world. The thing that 
receives the most accolades from our students in this project is not 
the specific programs, such as Lives of Commitment or the Summer 
Fellows program, but the opportunity to stop and reflect on what 
one is doing, why one is doing it, and how it is drawing together the 
dizzying academic insights with the shaping of the soul. The Lilly 
Project is the speed bump in the Macalester autobahn.
But other developments in our life here at Macalester are indicators 
of the need for an integrated life and world.
•  The development of the Multifaith Council at Macalester came out 
of the deep hunger in our students to be honest about their own 
religious and spiritual lives, lives that caused anxiety for some in 
this very secular and sometimes religiously intolerant campus. Hav-
ing a place where students can explore their own religious/spiritual 
tradition in depth, and also to engage those whose assumptions 
may deeply conflict or run counter to their own in honest conversa-
tion, is excellent preparation for a world in which people are killing 
each other over conflicting gods. Even in its first year, the amazing 
opportunities to live in a religiously flourishing environment and to 
dare to craft a religiously pluralistic Macalester culture has awak-
ened the imagination of each person on the Council.
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•  The Pluralism and Unity Project that takes first-year students from 
diverse backgrounds and calls them to get to know each other and 
the wider Twin Cities community through the lens of race, ethnicity, 
and culture. Even the name calls out the type of educational life I am 
suggesting.
One of the suspicions I have about an undivided life at Macalester 
is that what we discover when we go deeply into the soul of this insti-
tution and into shaping a community of knowing in the fullest sense 
is that we will discover in our differences the yearning for a deeper 
knowing and connection.
With all this said, you might respond, how is this global citizen-
ship? I think we have too narrowly defined what we mean by global, 
somehow equating it only with things that are international, multi-
national, beyond our borders. I want to propose that global certainly 
comprises that definition, but also global is the large view, the vistas of 
our human inner landscape and the universe’s story. Such citizenship 
is not only political, social, and economic, but also aesthetic, ethical, 
and religious.
Martha Nussbaum, in her book Cultivating Humanity, describes a 
liberal education as, “the preparation of a whole human being for the 
functions of citizenship and life.” This entails the “cultivation of three 
capacities:”
1.   A capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s tradi-
tions,
2.   An ability to see oneself not simply as a citizen of a local region 
or group but also as a human being bound to all other human 
beings by ties of recognition and concern, and
3.   The narrative imagination which “is the ability to think what 
it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from 
oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story and to 
understand the emotions and wishes and desires that some-
one so placed might have. This means “learning how to be a 
human being capable of love and imagination.”3
I am awed by the remarkable capacity of our students to engage 
the ambiguity of our world and mostly come out on the side of love 
and imagination. I am inspired by the urgency of not only our current 
students but students throughout our history that have held the vision 
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confidently that we must contribute to our world, we must defy the 
cultural trends toward consumer capacity-building. They have kept 
their sights set on their place in the muck of it all, in the miracle of it 
all.
I think that an occasion like this one that asks us to think big and 
learn large is a time to ask the profound questions. One of those ques-
tions is, “What is the soul of Macalester College?” What is at the very 
center of our life together, not as a static reality but the living, breath-
ing, alive, stumbling, and standing Macalester College? Robert McAfee 
Brown, a theologian who taught here in the 1970s, once said, “The 
larger the horizon becomes, the smaller the world turns out to be.”4 
This paradox of the world writ large on our consciousness, and the 
issues of our day arriving at our own doorstep and asking us to deal 
with them, is what global citizenship requires of a Macalester student.
Each and every one of us in this institution, from the full professor 
to the greenest first-year student, must engage in the perilous task of 
taking up our particular role as a global citizen. That raises the stakes 
pretty high and it also means that we must be willing to sacrifice 
and deeply care about the commons in our activity on campus. This 
means we are not only smart but we strive for wisdom, wisdom that 
is marked by paradoxes such as: Dying is what gives deep life, sacri-
fice brings abundance, confusion gives way to insight. Our days bring 
us the opportunity to turn up every stone and see what is crawling 
around under there. Our days demand that we take audacious risks, 
only to crack open the soul’s light to the enormous power of perilous 
hope. This time in history requires that every brilliant thought be har-
nessed by our academic institutions in collaborative efforts to address 
the most pressing problems of our globe. One writer by the name of 
Reverend Virginia Safford advises us to, “plant ourselves at the gates 
of hope,” even in situations of pessimism, because “with our lives we 
make our answers all the time, to this ravenous, beautiful, mutilated, 
gorgeous world.”5
The complexity of the world demands that the divide between the 
mind and the heart be bridged. When we overemphasize the critical 
capacity, then the affective capacity atrophies—the spiritual as well. 
When we venture into the heart of mystery, we must never allow the 
critical edge to cut out the heart…taking with it hope and leaving us in 
a cynical stew.
The contribution of the Institute for Global Citizenship must be 
more than just flexing our critical muscles in order to see the world’s 
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issues clearly, but shaping an imagination from a deeply knowing 
heart that engages the world in all its complexity and takes the time to 
do the very hard work of creating an imagination of what can be, what 
must be. To quote Dianna Chapman Walsh again, “as sure as I am that 
we are providing our students with a great education, I’m equally 
sure that we are letting them down in important ways—not feeding 
their yearning to be living the deepest ontological questions they see 
unfolding around them and within them, which they don’t know quite 
how to embrace, but attending chiefly to their minds when their hearts 
(and ours) are being broken by events in the world.”6
The global demands that arrive at our threshold are shaping our life 
here at Macalester. But it not lost on me that our common life happens 
under the United Nations’ flag flying overhead. We “on the ground” 
are challenged by a world that is anything but united, but we have 
the opportunity, in living our life in this place, to be exemplars of a 
united heart, mind, soul, and strength. We have the opportunity here 
at Macalester to shape on this soil the world in the way we want it to be 
outside this place. And in our actions we have the opportunity to build 
a bridge from this place into the frontiers of the future, as stewards of 
our life and the life of this planet. •
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Just Membership 
in a Global Community
Seyla Benhabib
At the dawn of a new century the transnational movement of peo-
ples has emerged as a major political issue of our times. Whether initi-
ated by economic migrants from the poorer regions of the world trying 
to reach the shores of resource-rich democracies in the North and the 
West, or undertaken by asylum and refuge seekers escaping persecu-
tion, civil wars, and natural disasters, or caused by “displaced per-
sons” fleeing ethnic conflict and state-inflicted violence in their own 
societies, such movements have presented the worldwide state system 
with unprecedented challenges.
Here are some numbers. It is estimated that whereas in 1910 roughly 
33 million individuals lived as migrants in countries other than their 
own, by the year 2000 that number had reached 175 million. Strikingly, 
more than half of the increase of migrants from 1910 to 2000 occurred 
in the last three decades of the twentieth century, between 1965 and 
2000. In this period, 75 million people undertook cross-border move-
ments to settle in countries other than that of their origin.1
While migratory movements in the latter half of the twentieth 
century accelerated, the plight of refugees has also grown. There are 
almost 20 million refugees, asylum seekers, and “internally displaced 
persons” in the world. The resource-rich countries of Europe and the 
Northern Hemisphere face growing numbers of migrants, but it is 
mostly nations in the Southern Hemisphere, such as Chad, Pakistan, 
and Ingushetia, that are home to hundreds of thousands of refugees 
fleeing wars in the neighboring countries of the Central African Repub-
lic, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.
45
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Since September 11, 2001, the discourse on immigration has also 
been increasingly criminalized. Non-members seeking entrance into 
countries other than their own, for any of the above-named reasons, are 
increasingly considered as “threats” and potential “criminals.” This is 
most strikingly reflected in the fact that the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service of one of the oldest immigrant countries of the world, 
namely the U.S.A., has now become incorporated into the Department 
of (so-called) Homeland Security.
Given the salience of these developments, it is surprising that the 
cross-border movements of peoples, and the philosophical as well as 
policy problems suggested by them, have been the object of such scant 
attention in contemporary political thought.2 In my recent book, The 
Rights of Others,3 I intended to fill this lacuna by focusing on politi-
cal membership. By this term I meant the “principles and practices for 
incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refu-
gees and asylum seekers into existing polities.” The principal category 
through which membership has been regulated in the modern world, 
namely national citizenship, has been disaggregated or unbundled into 
diverse elements, and state sovereignty has been frayed. Consequently, 
“We are like travelers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of 
old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. 
While the terrain we are traveling on, the world society of states, has 
changed, our normative map has not.”4
From a philosophical point of view, transnational migrations bring 
to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies 
between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and 
adherence to universal human rights principles, on the other. There is 
not only a tension but often an outright contradiction between human 
rights declarations and the sovereign claims of states to control their 
borders as well as to monitor the “quality” and quantity of those admit-
ted. There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas posed by these dual 
commitments. As the institution of citizenship is disaggregated and 
state sovereignty comes under increasing stress, sub-national as well 
as supra-national spaces for democratic attachments and agency are 
emerging in the contemporary world, and they need to be advanced 
with, rather than in lieu of, existing polities.
In this essay, I begin by exploring the origins of the institution of cit-
izenship, then consider the “disaggregation” of citizenship within the 
European Union and in some other countries of the world, and finally 
I return to recent developments within the United States concerning 
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immigration and conclude with philosophical reflections upon “just 
membership.”
I. Citizenship in Western Political Thought
The concept of citizenship is one of the cornerstones of Western politi-
cal thought. In Greek thought the terms polis, politeia, politike, and poli-
tikon are all derived from the same root. Their Latin cognate is civitas, 
from which is derived “citoyenne” in French and “citizen” in English. 
In German, we encounter the term burgh, meaning fortress or town, 
and the derivation of burgher, as in Staatsburger,5 the German term for 
citizen. In Turkish the word for citizen, Vatandas, derives from the term 
Vatan (which may be Arabic in origin) and which means “homeland.”
This brief etymology serves to remind us that citizenship means first 
and foremost membership in a bounded community. What such mem-
bership entails is itself dependent upon the nature of the political com-
munity. As Aristotle noted, a citizen in a democracy is not the same as 
a citizen in an aristocracy: in a democracy all can vote, without qualifi-
cations of descent and property, while in an aristocracy only some can.6 
Throughout the history of the West, citizenship has excluded certain 
groups of individuals, whether they be women, non-propertied and 
laboring males, or non-Christian and non-white peoples. These human 
beings have been barred from citizenship on the grounds that they did 
not possess the necessary attributes for citizenship, which were often 
understood in conventional terms such as lack of property or income. 
More often, though, they were regarded in much more essentializing 
terms as lacking the requisite capacities of intellect and emotion.7
With the advent of political modernity through the American and 
French Revolutions, citizenship was extended to ever larger numbers 
of human beings. It was also enriched through the growth of rights 
and entitlements that accrued to this status.8
Modern citizenship still means membership in a bounded politi-
cal community, which can be a nation-state, a multinational state, or a 
commonwealth structure. The political regime of territorially bounded 
sovereignty, exercised through formal-rational administrative proce-
dures and dependent upon the democratic will of a more or less cul-
turally homogeneous group of people, can only function by defining, 
circumscribing, and controlling citizenship. Ideal-typically, the citizen 
is the individual who has membership rights to reside within a terri-
tory, who is subject to the state’s administrative jurisdiction, and who 
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is also, at least in principle, a member of the democratic sovereignty in 
whose name laws are issued and administration is exercised. Follow-
ing Max Weber, we may say that this unity of residency, administrative 
subjection, political participation, and cultural membership constitutes the 
“ideal typical” model of citizenship in the modern nation-state of the 
West.9 The influence of this model, whether or not it adequately corre-
sponds to local conditions, extends far beyond the West. Modernizing 
nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, which entered the process 
of state formation at later points than their West European counter-
parts, copied this structure when they came into existence as well.
What is the status of citizenship today, in a world of increasingly 
deterritorialized politics? How is citizenship being reconfigured under 
contemporary conditions? How have globalization and the weakening 
of the functions of the state in controlling and protecting its economy, 
culture, and boundaries against the forces of globalization affected the 
theory and practice of citizenship? How has globalization contributed 
to the reconfiguration of multiculturalism? Which are the most salient 
conflicts around cultural identities in today’s world?
II. Globalization and New Forms of Political Conflict
Recalling Vaclav Havel’s words may give us some insights into these 
questions. In a graduation address to Harvard undergraduates more 
than a decade ago, Havel said, “This civilization is immensely fresh, 
young, new and fragile… . In essence, this new, single epidermis of 
world civilization merely covers or conceals the immense variety of 
cultures, of peoples, of religious worlds, of historical traditions and 
historically formed attitudes, all of which in a sense lie ‘beneath’ it.” 
The spread of globalization is accompanied by new forms of resistance 
and struggle, along with demands for “the right to worship…ancient 
Gods and obey ancient divine injunctions.” The new global civilization 
has to understand itself “as a multicultural and multipolar one.”10
As Havel notes, our contemporary condition is marked by the emer-
gence of new forms of identity politics around the globe. Such identity 
politics, driven by the attachments of nationality, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, “race,” and language, are particularly widespread in the fol-
lowing domains: (1) At the thresholds and borders of new nation-
states, which have emerged out of the disintegration of communist 
regimes in the territories of the older Soviet Union and Eastern and 
Central Europe; (2) In Africa, where the nation-state, a fragile insti-
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tution with roots barely half a century old, is crumbling in Rwanda, 
Uganda, the Congo, and the Ivory Coast; (3) In the Middle East, where 
as a result of the Gulf and Iraq Wars and the continuing Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict, nation-state boundaries, which were haphazardly drawn 
by the occupying powers at the end of the First World War after the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire, seem more problematic than ever; (4) In 
failed states such as Afghanistan, where prior to U.S. intervention, an 
armed group such as the Taliban could take state power, while leaving 
some areas of the country to the authority of warlords; (5) Compared 
to these kinds of identity politics which emerged through institutional 
failures affecting states’ capacities, the most prevalent form of identity 
politics in Western democracies since the late 1960s has been struggles 
for multicultural inclusion, and in some cases, for the multicultural 
diversification of citizenship concepts.
The worldwide women’s and Gay and Lesbian movements, the 
Quebecois aspirations in Canada, the Basque separatist movement in 
Spain, and the ethnic pride movements in the U.S.A. are some of the 
best known “struggles for recognition,” to use Charles Taylor’s famous 
term.11 Reflecting a social dynamic that we have hardly begun to com-
prehend, globalization has thus proceeded alongside socio-cultural 
disintegration, the resurgence of various separatisms, and interna-
tional terrorism.
The impact of these developments upon the institution of citizen-
ship has been “the disaggregation of citizenship.” Ideally, citizenship 
had bundled together residency, administrative subjection, democratic par-
ticipation, and cultural membership. What we are seeing today is that 
the unity of residency, administrative subjection, cultural identity, and 
democratic participation—in short, the modernist and unitary con-
ception of citizenship—is being deeply challenged. Nationality and 
residency status are uncoupled, in that increasing numbers of indi-
viduals reside in countries where they are not nationals. Furthermore, 
residency is accompanied by entitlement to extensive social rights; in 
some cases, even political participation rights are granted on the basis 
of residency and not citizenship.
These developments have taken place against the background 
created by the rise of an international human rights regime. By an 
“international human rights regime,” I mean a set of interrelated and 
overlapping global and regional regimes that encompass human rights 
treaties as well as customary international law or international soft 
law.12 Such examples would include the U.N. treaty bodies under the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention 
of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
The establishment of the European Union (EU) has been accompa-
nied by a Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the formation of a 
European Court of Justice. The European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which also encom-
passes states that are not EU members, permits the claims of citizens 
of adhering states to be heard by a European Court of Human Rights. 
Parallel developments can be seen on the American continent through 
the establishment of the Inter-American System for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
While these treaties are binding on signatory states alone, they have 
set into motion certain developments within global civil society. In the 
words of Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International law today is undergo-
ing profound changes that will make it far more effective than it has 
been in the past. By definition international law is a body of rules that 
regulates relations among states, not individuals. Yet over the course 
of the 21st century, it will increasingly confer rights and responsibili-
ties directly on individuals.”13
Against this general background let me analyze the disaggregation 
of citizenship effect more closely.
III. Disaggregation of Citizenship: The Case of the European Union
The view that citizenship is a status that confers entitlements (that is, 
benefits as well as obligations) derives from T.H. Marshall.14 Marshall’s 
catalogue of civil, political, and social rights is based upon the cumula-
tive logic of struggles for expanding democracy in the 19th and early 
part of the 20th centuries. “Civil rights” arise with the birth of the 
absolutist state, and in their earliest and most basic form they entail 
the rights to the protection of life, liberty, and property; the right to 
freedom of conscience; and certain associational rights, like those of 
commerce and marriage.
“Political rights” in the narrow sense refer to the rights of self-deter-
mination, to hold and run for office, and to establish political and non-
Civic Forum 2007
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political associations, including a free press and free institutions of 
science and culture.
“Social rights” are last in Marshall’s catalogue. They were achieved 
historically through the struggles of workers, women, and other social 
movements of the last two centuries. Social rights entail the right to 
form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, 
health care rights, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, 
childcare, housing, and educational subsidies. These social rights vary 
widely across countries and depend on the social class compromises 
prevalent in any given welfare-state democracy. Their inclusion in any 
internationally agreed upon catalogue of universal human rights—
beyond the mere right to employment and a decent standard of liv-
ing—is a bone of contention among different countries with varying 
economic outlooks.
The disaggregation effect is most advanced in today’s world in the 
contemporary European Union, in which the rights of citizens of the 25 
member countries are sharply delineated from those of third-country 
nationals, within a patchwork of local, national, and supranational 
rights regimes. These so-called “third-country nationals” include 
about three million Turks, scattered across Germany, the Netherlands, 
France, Sweden, Denmark and the U.K.; close to two million members 
from the federation of former Yugoslav states living throughout EU 
countries; about 820,000 Algerians; 516,000 Moroccans; 200,000 Tuni-
sians, mainly in France; and 689,000 migrants from India, 547,000 from 
the West Indies, and 406,000 from Pakistan, mainly in the U.K., some of 
whom have Commonwealth citizenship.
According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003, 
which was not ratified by member states, and was rejected through 
Dutch and French referenda in 2005) and following upon the earlier 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992), “Every national of a Member State shall 
be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to national citizenship and shall not replace it.”15 Nationals of all 25 
countries who are members of the European Union (the U.K., France, 
Germany, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, Poland, Hun-
gary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Lat-
via, Malta, and Cyprus) are also citizens of the European Union. What 
does being a citizen of the Union mean? What privileges and respon-
sibilities, what rights and duties does this entitle? Is citizenship in the 
Union merely a status category, as was membership in the Roman 
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Empire?16 Does membership in the EU amount to more than possess-
ing a passport that allows one to pass through the right doors at border 
crossings?17
Clearly, Union membership is intended to be more than that. Not 
just a passive status, it is expected to involve an active civic identity. 
Citizens of EU states can settle anywhere in the Union, take jobs in 
their chosen countries, and vote as well as stand for office in local 
elections and in elections for the Parliament of Europe. They have the 
right to enjoy consular and diplomatic representation in the territory 
of a third country in which the member state whose nationals they are 
may not be represented. They have the right to petition the European 
Parliament and to apply to the European Ombudsman.18 As Euro-
pean monetary and economic integration progresses, EU members are 
debating whether Union citizenship should entail an equivalent pack-
age of social rights and benefits, such as unemployment compensation, 
health care, and old age pensions, which members of EU states can 
enjoy in whichever EU country they take up residency.
The unitary model of citizenship that combined continuous resi-
dency in a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoy-
ment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative 
jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but not 
another. One can have political rights, such as local and EU level par-
ticipation and voting rights, without being a national, as is the case 
for EU citizens. More commonly, though, as a “guest worker” one has 
social rights and benefits without either sharing in the same collective 
identity or having the privileges of political membership. But this lat-
ter claim also needs modification. In countries such as the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden, “third-country nationals” are also granted 
some political participation and voting rights. In the U.K., Common-
wealth members can vote in local elections.
A two-tiered status of foreignness has evolved: on the one hand, 
there are third-country national foreign residents of European coun-
tries, some of whom were born and raised in these countries and know 
no other homeland; on the other hand are those who may be almost 
total strangers to the language, customs, and history of their host coun-
try but who enjoy special status and privileges in virtue of being a 
national of an EU member state.19
The obverse side of membership in the EU is a sharper delineation 
of the conditions of those who are nonmembers. The agreements of 
Schengen and Dublin were intended to make the practices of granting 
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asylum and refugee status more uniform throughout member states.20 
Referred to as “legal harmonization” in the early 1990s, these agree-
ments had the paradoxical effect of making such status in the Union 
increasingly difficult.21 Although the European Council of Ministers 
reiterates its adherence to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers and its Protocol of 1967, the EU seeks enhanced 
cooperation with sender countries in controlling the readmission and 
return of their nationals who reach EU territory illegally. Cooperative 
efforts with sender lands to enhance border controls, intercept ille-
gal immigrants, and create asylum systems have increased. Since in 
many cases individuals seeking asylum and refuge are escaping the 
oppressive, illegal, and even murderous regimes of their own coun-
tries, enhanced cooperation with these governments can only have 
disastrous effects upon their lives. A very serious danger posed by 
these developments is the undermining of the individual rights-based 
system of the Geneva Convention and of the moral as well as consti-
tutional obligations of individual states toward refugees and asylum 
seekers, which were based on their own past histories of collaboration 
or resistance to fascism and totalitarianism.22
IV. Citizenship in Non-European Contexts
Can this “disaggregation of citizenship” model be generalized across 
regions and countries? Despite being the largest immigrant nation 
in the world, the American conception of citizenship has remained 
remarkably unitary at the level of granting political rights, by mak-
ing “naturalization” a precondition for political voice. Unlike in some 
countries of the EU, there are no voting rights for legal residents within 
the U.S.A. at either the local or the statewide levels. This practice is 
usually defended by the argument that since the granting of citizen-
ship to legal migrants is fairly open, transparent, and speedy, it is not 
unfair to make the acquisition of citizenship a precondition for politi-
cal voice.23
This argument, however, does not attend to the facts on the ground. 
There are at present an estimated twelve million, in official language, 
“illegal migrants” in the U.S. I prefer to call them “undocumented 
migrants.” Many of these individuals are active and contributing 
members of society. Many serve in the national labor force, work-
ing on farms and in hospitals, hotels, and sanitation services. Others 
send their children to school and are active on community and school 
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boards. These individuals, who service hospitals as nurses or orderlies, 
are themselves scared to become sick and dependent on hospital facili-
ties. Not having one’s papers in order in our society is a form of civil 
death. The status of an illegal migrant is one denuded of political voice 
and the protection of civil laws.
More poignantly, on April 4, 2003, U.S. newspapers reported the 
case of Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez, aged 27, who died in a tank 
battle outside Umm Qasr in Iraq on March 21, 2003. Corporal Gutier-
rez was an illegal immigrant from Guatemala, an orphan who had 
reached the United States through clandestine means and who joined 
the Marines in California. His case is by no means unusual: over a 
dozen legal and illegal immigrants, mainly from Mexico and Central 
America, who were members of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in 
Iraq, have lost their lives since March 2003. It is estimated that about 
37,000 immigrants serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, making up about 
3% of the population on active duty. Their sad stories compelled both 
conservative and liberal lawmakers to hastily pass bills granting these 
slain soldiers, and in some cases their spouses and children, post-
humous citizenship. Others suggested that immigrants who join the 
Armed Forces be granted citizenship immediately, while still others 
advocated the reduction of the current waiting period for the granting 
of citizenship to those in the military from three to two years.
This is by no means the first time that immigrants have served in 
the U.S. army. With the abolition of universal conscription, however, 
joining the army has become a venue for upward mobility for large 
numbers of low-income legal and illegal migrants. We thus have the 
disturbing case of individuals dying for a country that denies them 
voting rights if they are legal permanent residents waiting to become 
“naturalized”; and if they are illegal migrants, as was the case with 
Corporal Guttierez, they do not even have the right to obtain a license 
or open a bank account.
The causes of migrant “illegality” can vary from bureaucratic mis-
haps and mistakes to desperate attempts to escape home countries via 
smugglers, known as “coyotes,” because of circumstances there. The 
status of illegality should not stamp the other as an alien. Clearly, a 
democratic adjustment of the practices of legal incorporation is needed 
in order to normalize the status of illegal immigrants.
While illegal migrant status means civil death and political silenc-
ing, the lack of a political voice for legal permanent residents means 
their effective disenfranchisement. An increasing number of individu-
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als wish to retain dual citizenship or to live in one country on a long-
term basis while not abdicating their original nationality. Making the 
exercise of democratic voice dependent upon one’s nationality status 
alone, as the United States laws do, flies in the face of the complex 
interdependence of the lives of peoples across borders and territories.
The immigration bill that failed to pass the Senate in spring 2007 
(S. 1348), “A bill to provide for comprehensive immigration reform 
and for other purposes,” was a double-edged sword. While it prom-
ised amnesty to millions of undocumented workers, the attainment of 
which entailed a number of onerous logistical and financial loopholes, 
it also changed the meaning of immigration in ways that have not been 
noted. President Bush’s proposal for a guest worker program obliges 
these individuals to leave the U.S. after their contracts are up, without 
the possibility of ever acquiring permanent residency or, eventually, 
citizenship status. This bill proposes to make into U.S. law the creation 
of a permanent global underclass that services the U.S. economy but 
can never have access to the benefits of a democratic voice and U.S. 
citizenship. This is a radical reversal of the self-understanding of this 
country as a “nation of immigrants,” and this shift in policy reflects the 
paranoid politics of the post-9/11 world in which the “foreigner” and 
the “immigrant” are not viewed as a potential partners with whom 
we must share a moral and political space, but as “threats,” as “enemy 
aliens.” (Given the heated race for the 2008 Presidential elections in the 
U.S.A., this bill has now been tabled till some indefinite date, and cer-
tainly till after the elections.)
While the United States has remained impervious to many calls to 
facilitate dual citizenship and is making it increasingly difficult for 
guest workers to attain American citizenship, countries like Mexico 
and the Dominican Republic permit their large diasporic populations 
to retain certain citizenship rights at home, such as voting in local and 
national elections, continuing to own property, and, in the cases of 
the Dominican Republic and Colombia, even running for and holding 
office. Increasing numbers of Israeli citizens also hold dual citizenship, 
either with the U.S.A. or with other countries of origin. Throughout 
Southeast Asia, India, and Latin America, “flexible citizenship,” which 
permits the disaggregation of aspects of citizenship by giving indi-
viduals multiple residency, property, and political participation rights, 
is emerging as the norm.24
Nevertheless, there is a paradox that affects most of these develop-
ments and which is inherent in the logic of modern statehood and 
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citizenship. It is captured by Hannah Arendt with the phrase “the right 
to have rights.”
V. Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of The Right to Have Rights
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt wrote:
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are 
rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to a community into which 
one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer 
a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation where, unless he 
commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he 
does or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of 
people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to 
freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they 
please, but of the right to opinion… . We become aware of the existence of a 
right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged 
by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized 
community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not 
regain these rights because of the new global political situation.25
The first use of the term right in the phrase “the right to have rights” 
does not show the same discursive structure as its second use. In the 
first mention, the identity of the other(s) to whom the claim to be recog-
nized as a rights-bearing person is addressed remains open and inde-
terminate.26 Note that for Arendt such recognition is first and foremost 
a recognition of “membership,” the recognition that one “belongs” to 
some organized human community. One’s status as a rights-bearing 
person is contingent upon the recognition of one’s membership. Who 
is to give or withhold such recognition? Who are the addressees of 
the claim that one “should be acknowledged as a member?” Arendt’s 
answer is clear: humanity itself. And yet she adds, “It is not clear that 
this is possible.”27 The asymmetry between the first and second uses 
of the term right derives from the absence in the first case of a spe-
cific juridico-civil community of consociates who stand in a relation 
of reciprocal duty to one another. What would this duty be?: the duty 
to recognize one as a member, as one who is protected by the legal-
political authorities and treated as a person entitled to the enjoyment 
of rights.
In Arendt’s view, the right to have rights transcends the contingen-
cies of birth, which differentiate and divide us from one another. The 
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right to have rights can only be realized in a political community in 
which we are not judged by the characteristics that define us at birth, 
but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and say and 
think. “Our political life,” writes Arendt, “rests on the assumption 
that we can produce equality through organization, because man can 
act and change and build a common world, together with his equals 
and only with his equals…We are not born equal; we become equal as 
members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee our-
selves mutually equal rights.”28
To sharpen the issue, Arendt was just as skeptical about the ideals 
of world government as she was about the possibility of nation-state 
systems ever to achieve justice and equality for all. World government 
would destroy the space for politics by not allowing individuals to 
define shared public spaces in common. The nation-state system, on 
the other hand, always carries within itself the seeds of exclusionary 
injustice at home and aggression abroad.
While Arendt offers us only paradoxes, albeit fruitful ones that 
show new paths to thinking, we are by no means at a point where we 
have resolved them. But the sharp contrasts which she drew between 
human rights and citizens’ rights have been mitigated through the 
evolution of cosmopolitan norms and the disaggregation of citizen-
ship. National membership is no longer the sole guarantor of access 
to rights and entitlements. Increasingly, the world legal community is 
recognizing a human right to membership, which means the obligation 
of states to naturalize long-term residents and not to denationalize or 
deny citizenship to others.29
Just membership in the new global civil society entails recognizing 
the moral claim of refugees and asylum seekers to first admittance; a 
regime of porous borders for immigrants; an injunction against dena-
tionalization and the loss of citizenship rights; and the vindication of 
the right of every human being “to have rights,” that is, to be a legal 
person, entitled to certain inalienable rights, regardless of the status 
of their political membership. The status of alien ought not to denude 
one of fundamental rights. Furthermore, just membership also means 
the right to citizenship on the part of the alien who has fulfilled certain 
conditions. Permanent alienage is not only incompatible with a liberal 
democratic understanding of human community, it is also a viola-
tion of fundamental human rights. The right to political membership 
must be accommodated by practices that are non-discriminatory in 
scope, transparent in formulation and execution, and justiciable when 
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violated by states and other state-like organs. The doctrine of state 
sovereignty, which has so far shielded naturalization, citizenship, and 
denationalization decisions from scrutiny by international as well as 
constitutional courts, must be challenged. •
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Dr. Seyla Benhabib’s article, “Just Membership in a Global Commu-
nity,” explores the shifting meaning of political membership in the 
current conditions of global migration. She investigates the conflict, 
in her words, the “outright contradiction,” between democratic sover-
eignty—the claim of a self-governing people to define its community by 
limiting its membership—and the recognition of the “right to belong” 
to which, according to Dr. Benhabib, any human is entitled. The very 
term global citizenship—the status of one who claims membership in a 
limited political community, while simultaneously placing him or her-
self in the community of human inhabitants of the earth—evokes this 
tension. How is it possible to assert one’s belonging in a community 
while simultaneously recognizing the rights of nonmembers, the rights 
of others, to enter into the space delimited by this community or to 
ultimately become members themselves?
I will respond to Dr. Benhabib’s essay primarily through an analysis 
of the human right to belong, and human rights in general, to which 
she appeals. After examining her discussion of the “right to have 
rights,” I will consider possible philosophical bases for such a human 
right, focusing in particular on the Kantian theory of philosopher Alan 
Gewirth. I criticize Gewirth’s portrayal of the human agent, the subject 
of human rights, as purely rational and thus “universalizable,” and I 
claim that such an understanding of the human agent may be a source 
of the tension between citizenship and human rights that Benhabib 
describes. In the end, I argue that it is precisely an understanding of 
the particularized, historical nature of human agents, an understand-
ing that one’s position is not universal, that can inform a just practice 
of citizenship.
Dr. Benhabib explores the intersection of citizenship and human 
rights through an analysis of Hannah Arendt’s phrase, “the right to 
have rights.” This phrase, she explains, evokes a growing conscious-
ness in the current era of the right of an individual to belong to a politi-
cal community. Arendt’s first use of the term right captures this right to 
belong, this “human right to membership,” in Benhabib’s words. The 
second use of the term rights refers to the rights that an individual may 
hold as a member of a political community; these are the rights that a 
citizen enjoys. He or she may, as Benhabib states, “stand in a relation 
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of reciprocal duty” to other members of the community, and others 
must “recognize [this individual] as a member, as one who is protected 
by the legal-political authorities and treated as a person entitled to the 
enjoyment of rights.” Yet the status of an individual as a citizen of this 
political community, a claimant to rights in the second sense of the 
term, is dependent upon others’ recognition of this person as someone 
who can and should be a member of this community in the first place, 
evoked by the first use of the term.
Benhabib concludes her presentation by arguing that all human 
beings have the right to membership in a political community, and that 
as global citizens, we must work to affirm this universal human right 
through our own political practices. She calls upon states to recog-
nize the human rights of migrants and thus to allow refugees to enter 
their territories and to grant eventual citizenship to long-term resident 
aliens. It is the migrants’ fundamental status as human persons that 
entitles them to such political rights.
Benhabib’s argument, then, rests upon the claim that humans, as 
such, hold claim to certain rights, such as the right to belong. Yet, prob-
ing this assumption, we must ask in what sense human-ness justifies 
a claim to rights. What is it about human persons that entitles them to 
claim basic rights? What gives us the obligation to grant a refugee flee-
ing violence in his or her state entrance into the bounded territory of 
our community?
Explicitly in her article, Benhabib justifies human rights based upon 
international law and treaties formulated since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. The 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
became the basis for later international covenants, serves as a set of 
guiding principles for the treatment of individuals by their own states, 
by foreign states, or, most pertinent to our present discussion, when 
they cross state borders. While, as Dr. Benhabib notes, these treaties 
pertain to relations between signatory states and do not currently “con-
fer rights and responsibilities directly on individuals,” such treaties 
create a legal justification for human rights, a normative momentum 
toward the increased recognition of these rights by all states. Yet a legal 
justification for human rights is not sufficient, I argue, because we 
understand humans to have rights whether or not they are enforced or 
written into a treaty. We must not justify human rights based upon the 
way we currently recognize them, but we must rather justify a form of 
treatment that all humans deserve. In this way, we require a moral or 
normative justification of universal human rights. Such a justification 
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should be able to tell us what it is about a person that gives her a claim 
to certain rights or entitlements that she may demand from other per-
sons or governments.
Western moral philosophy yields many different methods for the 
justification of human rights. We could make a utilitarian defense, 
claiming that the recognition of human rights augments humanity’s 
happiness or welfare. We could argue from intuition, stating that 
human possession of certain rights is a self-evident truth. This position 
might coincide with a defense of human rights based on religion. Or, 
with John Rawls, we could argue that individuals considering their 
society from behind a “veil of ignorance,” unaware of their social loca-
tion, would choose to invest each individual in society with certain 
rights.
Another commonly invoked justification for universal human rights 
is that based upon human agency, and it is a form of this argument 
that I will briefly sketch and critique. Contemporary philosopher Alan 
Gewirth, arguing from the tradition of Kantian moral theory, pres-
ents us with one such argument for universal human rights. Gewirth 
premises his argument upon the claim that all humans are actual, 
prospective, or potential agents; in other words, any human is, will be, 
or could be an agent insofar as she can think rationally, act, and justify 
her act to others through communication.1 An agent acts intentionally 
in that she acts to achieve a certain purpose, which she views as a good 
or worthy end.2
Certain conditions, however, are necessary in order for the agent to 
achieve her purpose. Gewirth argues that successful action requires 
two necessary conditions: the freedom and the well-being of the 
actor. Freedom, here, is the ability to control “one’s behavior by one’s 
unforced choice while having knowledge of relevant circumstances.”3 
Well-being encompasses basic goods, such as life, bodily integrity, and 
mental stability; nonsubtractive goods, such as the ability to plan for 
the future (and thus not being lied to or stolen from); and additive 
goods, such as the right to education and the right not to be discrimi-
nated against based upon race, gender, sexuality, class, religion, nation-
ality, or ability.4 Both freedom and well-being are necessary for action, 
and, insofar as the agent understands the purpose of her action to be 
a good, her faculty of reason dictates that she must take her freedom 
and well-being to be necessary goods. In order to pursue her goals 
through action, then, an agent must make the prescriptive statement 
that freedom and well-being are goods that are due to her. The agent 
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must demand the right to freedom and well-being from others in order 
to take successful action.
The agent, then, claims that she holds rights to these necessary con-
ditions of freedom and well-being. But why must she recognize the 
rights of others, of humans as such? The agent, Gewirth argues, makes 
the claim to her own rights based upon the fact that she is a ratio-
nal person and prospective agent; she claims that she deserves rights 
because she has purposes that she wants to fulfill. But she must then 
accept that any rational, purposive agent is entitled to the same rights. 
Thus, in order to ensure that the necessary conditions of her own goals 
are met, the agent must recognize the rights of other agents to demand 
these same necessary conditions.5 Each agent, in this way, ought not 
to interfere with the rights of other rational prospective agents to free-
dom and well-being, and, in some cases, must assist other agents with 
the achievement of these conditions. Through this argument for the 
universal duty of a rational person to recognize the rights of another 
equally rational person placed in his or her situation, Gewirth devel-
ops a defense for universal human rights.
At this point, in an essay of greater length, I would first evaluate the 
logical soundness of Gewirth’s argument and subsequently determine 
whether the right to political membership that Dr. Benhabib discusses 
can follow from the rights to freedom and well-being that Gewirth 
defends. Because of the constraints of this essay, however, I will assume 
that Gewirth’s theory is sound and does entail a right to political mem-
bership. I will critique Gewirth’s account of the human subject of rights 
and will enquire as to whether the notion of rights itself makes sense 
under the framework of his theory.
Gewirth argues that the exercise of rationality circumscribes human 
agency, and thus any foundation for human rights. He claims that we 
should recognize the rights of others, such as refugees’ rights to even-
tual membership in our political communities, because, possessing 
the same rational capacities, we would make the same claim to rights 
in their situation. In other words, Gewirth derives a universal claim 
to human rights by abstracting the agent from her particular situa-
tion; this abstracted rational agent is interchangeable with any other 
rational agent who, placed in her situation of potential action, would 
demand the same rights. The moral agent is constituted not by her par-
ticular history of relationships, environment, and so forth, but rather 
by the rationality that she shares with all other humans.
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Gewirth’s method is sensible. In order to justify a claim that all 
humans deserve the same basic forms of respect, we must consider 
moral agents in light of the fundamental qualities that unite them, 
rather than in terms of the particular contexts that make each agent’s 
life unique. At the same time, however, shouldn’t an adequate justifica-
tion of human rights account for the differential positions of agents as 
well as the qualities that make them identical? For a right—a certain 
form of treatment demanded by one person of another person or gov-
ernment—is a demand that has been, or can be, denied. One articu-
lates the concept of rights only when a petitioned form of treatment, 
such as freedom of opinion or recognition as a member of a politi-
cal community, is denied or threatened. In other words, the notion 
of rights becomes meaningful only when humans situated in specific 
circumstances are denied the basic, requisite conditions for survival, 
happiness, or agency. In this way, it seems that any adequate account 
of human rights must comprehend agents both in terms of their uni-
versalizable qualities, the bases for their fundamental identity, as well 
as in terms of the particular lived contexts that make each agent’s life 
irreducible to any other.
Hannah Arendt, as quoted by Benhabib, explains the relevance 
of historical context to the understanding of political rights. Arendt 
writes, “We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights 
(and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s 
actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized 
community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and 
could not regain these rights because of the new global political situa-
tion.”6 Referring to the rise in a global consciousness of human rights 
following the Holocaust and other atrocities of the early and mid-20th 
century, Arendt demonstrates that talk of political rights only makes 
sense in the context of a current or past threat to human political mem-
bership. In order to develop a concept of a universal right to belong, 
we must understand that the position of an agent who is a citizen, a 
member of a political community, is precisely not “interchangeable” 
with that of all other agents.
One might respond to this claim, however, by arguing that the con-
cept of the human agent as rational, and thus located in a universaliz-
able position, is presupposed within the consideration of the particular 
circumstance described above. In order to understand that the dif-
ferential treatment of humans as regards fundamental conditions for 
life and agency is wrong, we must already understand that all humans 
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deserve the same basic form of treatment. In other words, an under-
standing of the identity of all humans underlies our intuition that it is 
wrong to deny persons the basic necessities for agency. Therefore, the 
objection continues, a particularized understanding of the agent is not 
logically necessary to a defense of human rights.
I would answer, however, that the historical necessity of human 
rights, as evidenced by events like the Holocaust, is, in part, what gives 
meaning to the notion of rights and cannot be separated from it. If 
certain agents’ claims to basic conditions of well-being or, in Arendt’s 
example, political membership, were not denied or threatened, no uni-
versalistic account of rights would be necessary. In other words, the 
notion of right itself loses sense in isolation from the historical cir-
cumstances from which it has arisen. Just as the concept of rights loses 
meaning outside of the lived context of human difference, so is any 
justification of rights, based necessarily on the human subject of rights, 
nonsensical if it does not include a consideration of lived context.
If it is true that Gewirth’s failure to situate the concept of rights, 
and the human subjects of these rights, in historical context renders 
his justification of human rights incomplete, then how does this con-
clusion inform Benhabib’s discussion of democracy and the right to 
belong? First, I would argue, my analysis of Gewirth’s theory suggests 
the grounding for an adequate philosophical defense of human rights. 
Such a defense would base itself upon a consideration of the agent both 
in terms of the rational qualities that he or she shares with all other 
humans and in terms of his or her contextual and historical situation, 
although I acknowledge the difficulties of formulating such a theory.
Secondly, and more deeply, the role of historical context in compre-
hending a human subject of rights may also inform the tension between 
the practice of political belonging and human rights that Dr. Benhabib 
discusses. Tension between democratic citizenship and human rights is 
in part the result of a purely universalistic understanding of the human 
agent. Citizenship is simultaneously an affirmation of one individual’s 
membership in a state and a denial of others’ membership. Citizenship 
is, in itself, exclusive. This exclusion can lead, as Benhabib’s examples 
of political refugees demonstrates, to situations in which individuals 
are denied membership in any state, or in any state that can sustain 
them. Yet if a U.S. citizen, for example, positioned to shape U.S. citizen-
ship policy through legislation, understands her obligations to oth-
ers solely in terms of the rational capacity she shares with them, this 
reality that some excluded others are stateless cannot enter into her 
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moral calculation. A human right to belong seems meaningless unless 
she comprehends the strata of political membership that differenti-
ates human subjects and her own role in propagating this differential 
membership through exclusive membership in her state. Insofar as a 
U.S. citizen understands the human agent as purely rational and thus 
universal, the exclusivity of her citizenship cannot emerge as morally 
relevant. Citizenship understood only from the perspective of the citi-
zen, which I argue follows from a purely universalistic understanding 
of the human agent, fundamentally conflicts with the recognition of a 
human right to belong.
I suggest that integral to the practice of membership itself—namely, 
in this case, the formulation of laws that grant or deny citizenship—is 
an understanding that not all humans share one’s position of political 
membership. In order to practice citizenship justly, in a way that rec-
ognizes the rights of others to also belong, we must attempt to under-
stand the way power and privilege constitute us, and those we label 
other, as human subjects.
Notes
1. Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: Univer-
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Intervention
Desirée Weber
I would like to begin by thanking Dr. Benhabib for sharing her insights 
with us and allowing undergraduate students to engage with her work 
in such a direct way. I would also like to thank the Institute for Global 
Citizenship for allowing me this opportunity to speak about such 
pressing concerns as globalization, democracy, and citizenship.
In addressing the issue of global citizenship, I would first like to 
offer a few remarks regarding my own questions about this complex 
issue, followed by a response to Professor Benhabib’s points. I will con-
clude with a brief consideration of the practical political implications 
of her arguments.
All of us certainly should, and perhaps must, grapple with the issues 
of global citizenship. I have an interest both in an academic sense and 
in a personal sense. Academically, I find that the issues of immigration, 
globalization, and human rights are often found at the confluence of 
politics and philosophy. Personally, as a German citizen but long-time 
resident of the United States, I am curious to see how building a cos-
mopolitan identity separate from, or in concert with, national identity 
can work. This is a particularly pressing issue at the 50th anniversary 
of the European Community and with the recent foreign policy choices 
of the Bush Administration.
Before I can even begin to define and circumscribe the complex 
notion of global citizenship, I find myself wondering in what context 
we are even asking these questions in the first place.
We do not ask these questions as a product of idle thought or aca-
demic privilege. Instead, we pose these questions in a world fraught 
with dangers, where conflicts abound and encounters with the foreign 
and the unknown are ever more frequent. It is in this context—one of 
contention and uncertainty—that these questions take on an urgency 
that they have not previously held. It is in this context that we are com-
pelled to ask, what is a global citizen? What are the rights and respon-
sibilities of global citizenship? These are important questions to which, 
I am not embarrassed to admit, I do not have any concrete answers. 
Perhaps in this too, there lies a point. Before any definitive answers 
can be given, we must take a step back. We must examine the context. 
These questions themselves are not neutral, either in their framing or 
in their possible answers.
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What are these framings that lie hidden? Or rather, what other ques-
tions should we raise and perhaps raise first? I will offer some pre-
liminary suggestions. First, who defines, or has the ability to define, a 
global citizen? Secondly, who has the resources, access, or even power 
to be a global citizen? My hope is that these questions are not a retreat 
into the ivory tower of inaction. I hope they do not keep us from acting 
as global citizens. Let us remember, too, that abstract and seemingly 
benign concepts can manifest themselves in much more pernicious 
ways when all is said and done.
In exploring the issues surrounding global citizenship, I would like 
to raise one further point. What happens when we encounter the for-
eign, strange, or threatening? Does our resolve waver or is it strength-
ened? It is one thing to profess our commitment to internationalism, 
multiculturalism, and service to society. It is quite another to stick to 
those ideals when the going gets rough. Again I return to the fram-
ing concerns I discussed earlier. We—all of us—are asked to be global 
citizens in a dangerous world; danger in a political sense, but also in 
a personal sense. In such encounters, one cannot simply leave one’s 
identity safely behind. Engaging with the world, whether a free or 
forced choice, always has some impact on our own selves. The Cana-
dian philosopher Charles Taylor has termed this the identity cost, the 
deeply personal and sometimes painful price for encountering what 
we don’t already know.1
Part of being a global citizen, then, is being prepared to be affected, 
just as much as we hope to affect; being prepared to put oneself on the 
line, as much as we ask others to do the same. Accepting the responsi-
bilities of being a global citizen (while also being aware of the dangers) 
will allow us to strengthen our commitment in the face of uncertainty. 
Perhaps it is exactly in those moments of uncertainty that our commit-
ments will be strengthened. Judith Butler, in her book Precarious Life, 
argues that events like 9/11 present us with a choice of what sorts of 
citizens we want to be.2 It is in this vein that I hope to embrace the chal-
lenges and dangers inherent in global citizenship.
With those preliminary concerns articulated, I would like to move 
on to the issues raised by Dr. Benhabib. These issues revolve around 
a central theme: the relationship between a cosmopolitan ethic and 
democratic self-governance, or manifested in slightly different terms, 
between sovereignty, on one hand, and human rights on the other; 
between national security, on the one hand, and asylum seekers’ rights 
on the other—even more generally, between identity and difference. 
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These are not meant to be simple dichotomies. Instead, they are con-
tradictions that these iterations have caused. Formulating an effective 
course of action requires that we consider the backdrop of larger his-
torical trends.
I would like to explore the question of immigration and citizenship 
in three realms: the cultural, the economic, and lastly within liberal 
democracy itself, where the two converge.
When considering the cultural aspect of the question, one conclu-
sion is that belonging to a community provides us with a sense of self. 
Yet how do we negotiate between that sense of self and the sense of the 
other, the other that is taking up residence, literally and symbolically, in 
our cultural community? I made reference earlier to the identity cost 
of the encounter. But in a related sense, where do we draw or re-draw 
the boundaries? There are dozens of recent examples in which immi-
grants assert a continued allegiance to their former cultural practices, 
sometimes to the exclusion of cultural practices found in their country 
of residency. Where do we draw the line, so to speak? Where do one 
culture’s rights end? Especially in the legal framework of the European 
Union, these challenges are forcing careful thought and perhaps recon-
sideration of traditional ways of thinking about rights, citizenship, and 
democratic values.
A similar problematique presents itself in economic terms. What is the 
relationship between immigration and economic structures? Certainly 
globalization is seen as a phenomenon that has precipitated immigrant 
flows. In her recent work on borders and democracy, Wendy Brown 
makes the argument that regulating immigration is an effort to regu-
late cheap labor. Globalization isn’t just about striking trade deals and 
opening new markets; at the same time that capital flows freely, the 
movement of people is being restricted, which leads me to my next 
question. Is the status quo becoming increasingly deterritorialized, as 
the waning of the nation-state model might have us believe? Or is it 
being “re-territorialized,” but this time along the lines of economic 
advancement? Here, too, immigration presents us with a complicated 
set of circumstances that must be understood if global citizenship is to 
become the way forward.
Thirdly, at the confluence of cultural and economic logic, liberal 
democracy certainly holds a central place in these debates. Hannah 
Arendt was concerned that we only seem to become sensitive to the 
lack of rights when we encounter the stateless. While one solution may 
be the supranational human rights framework that is in place now, this 
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situation has seemingly replicated her paradox. The only time when 
international human rights actually gain traction is precisely in the 
moment when a person’s rights have been revoked. Here the tension 
between international rights and sovereignty is most acute and where 
the waning of the nation-state creates new challenges for international 
law.
As William Connolly has pointed out, there is always one group, or 
a progression of groups, that are granted rights, only for others to be 
excluded. This is not always or necessarily as a direct result of grant-
ing rights to another set, but is this perhaps a fundamental condition 
of liberal democracy? Is it inevitable for liberal democracy to function 
so that there is always a group excluded, the excess that the system 
cannot account for and at the same time is the reservoir from which 
democracy draws to perpetuate itself? What do we do in the face of 
that contradiction?
In turning to the practical political implications of Dr. Benhabib’s 
work, I would like to point out one final hurdle. The advent of the War 
on Terror seems to be a step back, a disavowal of international human 
rights and a tightening of borders due to heightened security concerns. 
More broadly it has perverted the 1990s ideals that saw international 
human rights and democracy as making the world a more peaceful 
place. Witness the example of Guantanamo Bay. The extralegal status 
of the detainees and in fact the facility itself seem to signal a larger 
trend of disavowing international norms, at least on the part of the 
so-called hegemon. More importantly, it raises the question, “What 
compels the powerful to follow international norms at all?” Again the 
tension between international human rights and sovereignty rears its 
head and again the tenuous nature of our commitment to these ideals 
stares us in the face.
On a more critical note and perhaps a note of caution, I would like 
to encourage an investigation of whether or not the legal contradic-
tions in Guantanamo are not in fact the mechanism of governance that 
has been precipitated by the tension between international and domes-
tic law in general, a tension that the powerful are in a unique position 
to exploit.
In conclusion, I would like to leave you with this thought: Global 
citizenship requires an awareness of context, of the political forces 
that facilitate and hinder inclusion. The discourses of cosmopolitanism 
and rights are fragile and require attentiveness in order to shape their 
political development. There is a difficulty of translating ethic into 
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action. There is a difficulty in understanding the structures that define 
the scope of possible actions. It is our responsibility to try, even in the 
face of opposition and especially in the face of plurality, to achieve the 
highest goals of global citizenship.
Notes
1. Taylor 2002, p. 283.
2. Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (2004).
Bibliography
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Brown, Wendy. “Porous Sovereignty/Walled Democracy.” American Studies in the 21st 
Century Colloquium Series, March 26, 2007 (forthcoming).
Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2004.
Connolly, William. Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992.
Taylor, Charles. “Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual 
Schemes.” In Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, edited by Jeff 
Malpas, Ulrich von Arnswald and Jens Kertscher. Boston: MIT Press, 2002, p. 283.
75
Rosenberg: opening
Published by DigitalCommons@Macalester College, 2007
Page 76—BLANK
76
Macalester Civic Forum, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/maccivicf/vol1/iss1/6
Neoliberalizing Race
David Theo Goldberg
I. Globalization, Race
If the eighteenth century was considered the age of enlightenment 
or reason, and the nineteenth century that of imperialism, the second 
half of the twentieth century has increasingly been identified as the 
age of globalization. Yet there have been various versions of globaliza-
tion historically. Early modes of globalization were those stretching 
across known worlds in their day, among the states and city-states 
of the East that Gunder Frank analyzes in ReOrient, and their trading 
that stretched into the states and cities of the medieval Mediterranean 
Near East. There are no doubt others, linked to various empires. These 
might be called regional globalizations.
The first globalization with fully planetary stretch and pervasive 
world-making—or world-transforming—implications was the reach 
of Europeans to expand through exploration. It was ultimately to mag-
nify European power through new access to existing mineral sources 
elsewhere, and to revive and remake itself through novel supplies of 
raw materials, new markets, new pools of exploitable labor, and chal-
lenging new modes-of-being that prompted novel objects of desire. 
This proved so far reaching and transformative for the world that 
it came later to identify itself as the period of “modernization” (not 
that earlier periods in other sites hadn’t experienced moments of birth 
[natio], updating themselves, flourishing, and wilting)—with Europe-
ans regarding themselves as modern, precisely as Habermas and others 
have long pointed out. But the enormous reach, range, and redirection 
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of the European impact across the middle of the last millennium—on 
learning, commerce, war-making, technological innovation, produc-
tion, political organization, consumptive capacity, avariciousness, 
resource destruction, being and belonging, identity and interactivity, 
modes of thinking and existence, sensibility and sociability—signal 
a quality and quantity to the globalizing project that was genuinely 
singular. The notion of modernization in this context reveals less a 
measure of evolutionary success than a mark of re-making, with all its 
challenges and pitfalls, assertions and assertiveness, and devastations 
and destructiveness.
Race is commonly assumed in the popular imagination to be an 
antique notion, pre-dating this planetary globalization. It is considered 
a vestige of pre-modern or at least not adequately modernized social 
assertions and arrangements. I have argued extensively against this 
understanding, asserting that race is an irreducibly modern notion 
defining and refining modern state formation as this new form of 
planetary globalization takes shape. “Race” is so conceptually pliable 
and elastic that, since its early expression in the sixteenth century, it 
has shifted in meaning over time and space, assuming significance in 
terms of the prevailing conditions in the social region in which it is 
invoked. It is believed to account for and comprehend, to shape and 
order—in short, to manage—the demographic, political, cultural, and 
economic heterogeneities particular to the region at that time. These 
meanings overlap and “converse” with other regional landscapes. As 
a consequence, it is possible to draw generalizations, to identify broad 
transnational meanings for race at a common point in time.
II. Naturalizing Race, Race-ing History
Since being widely accepted as accounting for human variation, pre-
vailing patterns of racial theorizing and the rule they prompt can be 
divided between what I call racial naturalism and racial historicism. 
Racial naturalism is the idea that those of non-European descent are in 
some biological sense inherently or naturally inferior. This represents a 
very long and thick tradition in racial thinking and theorizing, running 
from the likes of Sepulveda in the mid-sixteenth century, through Vol-
taire and Blumenbach, Kant and Hume, Carlyle and Spencer, and the 
eugenicists and Social Darwinists, to the likes of Murray and Herrn-
stein, Coon and Rushton. Racial historicism, by contrast, consists of the 
set of claims that those not European or descended from Europeans 
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are not inherently inferior but historically immature or less developed. 
This is a tradition that runs through much of Euro-liberalism, arguably 
from Locke through such thinkers as John Stuart Mill and Auguste 
Comte, and mid-nineteenth century English political economists such 
as Merivale and Marx, to the formal colonial policies of assimilation-
ism, developmentalism, and progressivism.
Historicism assumed increasing force as a counter-voice to natu-
ralist racial presumptions from roughly the mid-nineteenth century 
onward. For a century or so, these two paradigms of racial rule were in 
more or less sharp and explicit contest with each other, both between 
and within racially conceived and ordered regimes. Where naturalism 
underpinned the institution of slavery, historicist racial presupposi-
tions tended to fuel abolitionist movements, proliferating as common 
sense in the wake of slavery’s formal demise, and promoted as civilized 
moral conscience in the face of persistent naturalist regimes.
Racial naturalism and racial historicism also underpinned different 
forms of colonizing regimes. In the case of naturalism, examples are 
the early Spanish colonialism in Latin America and the Portuguese and 
later Leopold’s Belgians in Africa. The British in India and the French 
in North Africa and the Caribbean are illustrative when it comes to 
historicism. By the close of the nineteenth century, naturalism found 
itself on the defensive because of increasingly heterogeneous urban 
arrangements, intensified migration between colonies and metropoles, 
and an emergent shift from biologically driven to culturalist concep-
tions of race. As (a set of) conceptual commitment(s), naturalism was 
explicitly challenged to defend and rationalize its claims in ways it had 
not hitherto faced. In short, by the mid-twentieth century, naturalism 
had shifted explicitly from the given of racial rule to the anomaly, from 
the safely presumed to the protested.
Naturalism increasingly gave way to the common sense of histori-
cism in the later nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, with the 
violence of an imposed physical repression yielding to the infuriating 
subtleties of a legally fashioned racial order. In modern constitutional 
terms, the law is committed to the formal equality of treating like alike 
(and by extension the unlike differently). This abstract commitment to 
formal equality, in turn, entails the color-blinding constitutionalism of 
“racelessness” as the teleological narrative of modernization and racial 
progress. Racelessness is the logical implication of racial historicism. It 
is the perfect blending of modernist rationality and the maintenance 
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of de facto, if “de-raced,” racial domination, juridically ordered and 
exercised.
III. Neoliberalizing Race
The Second World War is commonly assumed to have revealed the 
extreme dangers of racial conception and thinking, and what such 
commitments entail if not inevitably bring about. By the late 1940s, 
race was being challenged as a scientifically vacuous, morally repug-
nant, and politically dangerous notion. European societies especially 
sought to expunge race from social reference. This rejection, however, 
presupposed racial conception and its political order to be predicated 
quite exhaustively on its naturalistic interpretation. Following first the 
anti-colonial and then the civil rights struggles, increasingly the com-
mitment regarding race in social arrangements came to be expressed 
as color blindness, or more generally as racelessness. In Western 
Europe this followed almost immediately its painful wartime experi-
ences and its drive to reconstruct, reconfiguring as much Europe’s 
imagination of itself as the material conditions of its well-being. In the 
United States, the stress on color blindness took a couple of decades 
longer to solidify, materializing first as a characteristic expression of 
the civil rights regime and then as a reaction to its commitment to affir-
mative action. One was not supposed to judge intellectual or moral 
competence, or for that matter physical prowess, by the color of a 
person’s skin. Color blindness, or racelessness more generally, claimed 
to judge people according to individualized merit and ability. When 
members of a racially identified group were repeatedly judged to fail 
or to be less qualified, it would be attributed to the cultural deficien-
cies of the group, historically developed, rather than as naturalistically 
determined. Color blindness, far from inconsistent with racial histori-
cism, was its contemporary extension, the perfect cultural corollary for 
emergent neoliberal political economies.
The increasing stress on individualized merit and ability was coter-
minous with structural shifts in state formation, from welfarism to neo-
liberalism, ever since the second half of the 1970s. Neoliberalism took 
hold of political imaginaries as capitalism vigorously sought to expand 
its market reach, and as technologies of travel, communication, and 
information flows became speedier and more sophisticated, shrinking 
distances and compressing time. As globalization took on dramatically 
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new forms, its regimes of management and rule developed novel strat-
egies. Eventually, these cohered under the rubric of neoliberalism.
Neoliberal commitments were increasingly institutionalized under 
the rule of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Helmut Kohl, and 
have structurally transformed the state. From the 1930s through the 
1970s, the liberal democratic state offered a fairly robust set of institu-
tional apparatuses concerned (in principle at least) with advancing the 
welfare of its citizens. This was the period of social security, welfare 
safety nets, various forms of national health systems, the expansion of 
and investment in public education (including higher education, and 
in some states to the exclusion of private and religiously sponsored 
education), and the emergence of state bureaucracies as major employ-
ers. Since then, and as a reaction, the state has been molded into a 
structure increasingly securing privatized interests from the perceived 
contamination and threat of those deemed not to belong, to have little 
or no standing, the welfare of whom is calculated to cost too much, 
economically and politically.
Neoliberalism is identified as the undertaking to maximize corpo-
rate profits and efficiency by reducing costs, most notably as a conse-
quence of taxes, tariffs, and regulations, thus expanding the freedom 
of flows of capital, goods, services, and more recently of information. 
It is committed to let the market regulate itself so far as the artificial 
constraints of politics will allow, placing faith in its capacity to opti-
mize resource allocation and expand employment capacity as a result 
of sustained profitability and subsequent economic growth. It follows 
that neoliberalism is committed to de-nationalize industry and “de-
unionize” labor in the name of limiting state regulation and reducing 
public costs, and so rolling back the need for public funding.
In short, September 11 hastened and heightened the shift already 
well underway from the caretaker or pastoral state of mid-twentieth-
century welfare liberalism to the traffic-cop state of the turn of the 
millennium. The latter, by contrast, seeks to facilitate the privatization 
of property, revenue generation, utilities, services, and social support 
systems, including health care, aid, and disaster response and relief. 
The privatization of services is particularly revealing, shifting the tra-
ditional caretaking functions of the modern state (emergency relief, 
etc.) increasingly to charitable institutions. This inevitably produces 
bifurcated experiences of social goods and access, such as health care, 
education, and even public highways. In turn, privatized property, 
which is equated with nationalist identification and supplemental state 
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enforcement, has functioned to re-homogenize the body politic. Where 
the welfare state, with all its contradictions and failings, still produces 
a modicum of social egalitarianism, the neoliberal state exacerbates 
inequality, further privileging the already privileged.
In essence, neoliberal states are restricted to securing conditions 
for privatized interests to flourish, and to shaping (policing may not 
be too strong a term) the flows of information, capital, and consumer 
goods to these ends. Grover Norquist, the person most identified in the 
United States with articulating the neoliberal commitment, famously 
boasted that his “goal is to cut government in half in twenty-five years, 
to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub.” The 
rhetorical flourish and disarming bluntness of Norquist’s expression 
notwithstanding, the claim is somewhat misleading, if not downright 
disingenuous. The emphasis is less to get rid of the state—what, in any 
case, exactly would that mean?—than to shift its priorities radically, to 
redirect it to represent different interests, to do different work. Sup-
port for institutions of state violence (i.e., military, police, homeland 
security), their enactment, and (re)enforcement spiral upward at the 
cost of a diminishing treasury burdened by dramatic tax reductions for 
the wealthiest and consequently crimped state revenues and squeezed 
social welfare spending. Social welfare commitments, including subsi-
dized education and health care, would be de-funded and the resources 
sustaining them shifted to repressive state functionalities, such as the 
police, military, and prisons. Far from dismantling the state, or drown-
ing it, neoliberalism would make it more robust, more intrusive, more 
repressive.
The social ends of state emaciation, accordingly, are not that social 
spending should terminate. Rather, in being redirected into private 
hands, social spending and charitable giving are fashioned by and for 
the social and political interests of those with capital to spare. Those 
recalcitrant states or population factions not willing to support (or that 
indeed resist) the neoliberal political economy of structural adjust-
ment, debt creation, and regulation, are subjected to more direct force 
by the military or police. In the extreme, “uncooperative,” “rogue” 
forces, or unruly populations (states, communities, groups) are sub-
jected to “necropolitical” discipline through the threat of impris-
onment or death, physical or social. These forces of unruliness are 
likewise defined through racial extension and rearticulation. Where 
the prevailing social commitments for the liberal democratic state had 
to do with social well-being revealed in the registers of education, 
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work, health care and housing, the neoliberal state is concerned above 
all with issues of crime and corruption, controlling immigration, and 
tax-cut-stimulated consumption. The contemporary slogan of neoliber-
alism might as well be: The state looks after your interests by encour-
aging you to choose to lock yourself in (to gated communities) while it 
locks the undesirables up (in prisons) or out (by way of immigration 
restrictions). Where the liberal democratic state was concerned in the 
final analysis with the welfare of its citizens, the neoliberal state is con-
cerned above all with their security.
These transformations in the structure of the social fabric are ratio-
nalized to secure individuals, their families, and those they choose to 
care about. At the macro level neoliberalism expresses itself in terms of 
the nation over (even at the expense of) the state. The state is to stand 
for protecting me and those like me—my national family—and the rest 
be damned. The traditional language and objects of racial humilia-
tion, expunged from social characterization because at odds with the 
rabid individualized communalism, are not so much erased as simi-
larly structurally transformed. They now silently reference those who 
threaten their fiscal well-being (notably the perpetually unhealthy) or 
the social security of the nation (namely those deemed death approach-
ing, mainly young Muslim men and those, even entire nations, identi-
fied as or with them).
In the U.S., the Minutemen, a vigilante border patrol group fueled 
by Latin American anti-immigrant sentiment with tacit approval from 
the Bush administration, has been protesting recently under the slo-
gan, “This is America, get off my property.” In this, the Minutemen 
perfectly represent neoliberal state commitments. The traditional state 
function of border enforcement is abrogated to a private, self-promoted 
vigilante group. The claim to America is staked as a national one, 
the belonging to which is implicitly characterological. One is taken to 
belong because one embodies the characteristics—the character—of 
presumptive Americans, with rugged individualism racially coded 
as white. Public land, the property of the nation, is privatized and 
becomes enclosed, from which the group can expel those who do not 
“belong.” There is a privatizing, too, of extreme political expression, 
encouraging private sphere expression of views that the official repre-
sentatives of the state, with its nominal commitment to neutrality and 
formal equality, cannot be seen to stand for or express.
If the Minutemen trade on racial presumption implicit in the repre-
sentational codes they readily express and circulate, racial meanings 
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have animated neoliberal attacks on the welfare state. The most obvi-
ous example is the strident vocal attacks on the “Welfare Queen.” She is 
projected as the stereotypical single black mother of multiple children 
(usually portrayed as having different fathers), minimally educated, 
irresponsible, refusing work, and collecting welfare while partying all 
night long: sex, drugs, and rock ’n’ roll, at state expense.
Where the figure of the Welfare Queen suggested that the welfare 
state did nothing but support idle, undeserving, and overly fertile 
black women, the image of state support for the undeserving poor of 
color was branded into the social imaginary by the determined attack 
on affirmative action from the mid-1970s onward. Affirmative action 
was considered unacceptable to the neoliberal stress on individual 
merit because it was seen as rewarding undeserving people on the 
basis of group attributes or achievements, not on individual effort and 
excellence. Indeed, for neoliberals committed to privatizing individu-
alization, the standard racism (i.e., rewarding people for no reason 
other than their membership in a racial group) came to be considered 
affirmative action. Liberalism’s very instrument for undoing the effects 
of racism became neoliberalism’s poster child for the condition of rac-
ism itself.
These attacks on affirmative action reveal a deeper critical concern 
for neoliberals troubled over race. In the U.S., neoconservative crit-
ics of the state implicitly identify it as representing blackness and the 
interests thought most directly to advance black life. As a result both of 
serious application of antidiscrimination legislation and of affirmative 
action policies, the state became the single largest employer of African 
Americans. The perception among critics of these programs accord-
ingly devolved into the view that black people are either employed as 
beneficiaries of affirmative action or they are supported by welfare. In 
short, from the 1970s on, the state increasingly came to be conceived as 
a set of institutions supporting the undeserving (recall the identifica-
tion of Bill Clinton as “the first black President,” first by Toni Morrison 
but taken up quickly by neoconservatives out to do him in). Fear of a 
black state is linked to worries about a black planet, of alien invasion 
and alienation, of a loss of local and global control and privilege long 
associated with whiteness.
Neoliberalism, therefore, can be read as a response to this concern 
about the impending impotence of whiteness. Neoliberalism is com-
mitted to privatizing property, utilities, and social programs; to reduc-
ing state expenditures and increasing efficiencies; and to individual 
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freedom from state regulation. As the state was seen to support black 
employment, to increase expenditures on black education, and to 
increase regulation to force compliance, white neoconservatives began 
to find neoliberal commitments relevant to their interests. It was but 
a short step from privatizing property to privatizing race, removing 
conception and categorization in racial terms from the public to the 
private realm. It does not follow, however, that the state purges racism 
from its domain. Rather, the state is restructured to support the priva-
tizing of race and the protection of racially driven exclusions in the pri-
vate sphere where they are off-limits to state intervention. California’s 
happily defused experiment with the Racial Privacy Initiative best rep-
resents the sort of structure that proponents of neoliberal commitment 
seek to put in place.
The Racial Privacy Initiative was a ballot proposition placed before 
the California electorate in the November election of 2003. It was 
intended to restrict state government from collecting any racially iden-
tified data except principally for criminal justice investigations (police 
profiling) or certain sorts of medical research. It was designed to make 
it impossible to track ongoing racial discrimination across a wide range 
of social indices, including residential, educational, and employment. 
While the proposition significantly failed to garner electoral support, 
its terms of conception should be noted. The Racial Privacy Initiative 
was not a proposal to outlaw racial discrimination, address the past, 
or redress structural racism. It was, to put it bluntly, the “protection 
of private racial discrimination initiative,” the undertaking not just to 
privatize racism but to protect ongoing discrimination in private, to 
restrict it from scrutiny and intervention.
An example from a different social context illustrates the implica-
tions of such a policy. Having run out of beef one day, a privately run 
soup kitchen in Paris discovered by accident that if it made soup with 
pork neither Muslims nor Jews would eat it. This “identity soup,” as it 
came to be called, served as the rallying cry for those explicitly consid-
ering Europe to be white and Christian, for those jingoistically calling 
for “Ours before the Others.” The outcry for or against this expression 
of continental nativism notwithstanding, this sort of private expres-
sion would be beyond the reach of state restriction in the U.S. (though 
a number of municipalities in France subsequently banned it). The 
neoliberalizing of race accordingly entails the delimitation of public 
interventions to curtail racisms and the discriminations on which they 
invariably rest.
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The social traumas of post-Katrina New Orleans offer ample illus-
tration of these shifts from the pastoral care of welfarism to the cur-
tailed neoliberal state in the case of the U.S., leading the way both in 
definition and implementation of what we can properly now mark as 
the Age of Neoliberalism.
In the past couple of budget cycles, hyper-conservatives in the U.S. 
have targeted programs for the poor because they offer easy fiscal 
and political targets, and convenient ideological rationalizations. At 
the same time, defense budgets, whether narrowly or broadly inter-
preted, have spiraled upward. Thus, the defense budget for FY2006 
increased five percent from the previous year and almost twenty-five 
percent from its 2002 total. The $40 billion worth of cuts in the 2006 
budget projections were focused overwhelmingly on social programs 
like student loans, health care, and welfare for the poor. If one factored 
into the figure for the defense budget the entire range of institutional 
apparatuses sustaining the military presence at home and around the 
world (including $35 billion for Homeland Security, funds to fight in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the considerable sums for their respective 
reconstructions), the total would reach a staggering $900 billion, up 
roughly thirty percent since 2002.
Funding for education, health, housing, and transportation, as well 
as emergency relief, has been cut repeatedly. Since 2003, when it was 
incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been reduced by ten 
percent (if President Bush had had his way the cuts would have come 
closer to 25 percent). Between 2002 and 2004, for instance, states cut 
their budgets supporting public higher education by a total of ten per-
cent, adjusted for inflation. While first-rate public universities today 
receive only five to twenty-five percent of their operating budgets from 
their states, they typically are able to spend half or less on education 
per student than top-tier private universities. Students of color are 
overwhelmingly educated at public institutions, when they make it 
into higher education at all, while private universities are the preserve 
of wealthier whites. The cuts have had a debilitating effect on disaster 
preparedness and reconstruction, undercutting the agency’s ability to 
sustain support for those most in need, as witnessed in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and ceding to uncoordinated private chari-
ties the responsibilities of evacuation, clean-up, reconstruction, and 
care. The results have been more disastrous than the natural event of 
the hurricane itself.
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As with personal or corporate bankruptcy, the emaciation of the 
social support sector due to the shrinking of government revenues 
forces a radical restructuring of public programming and state gov-
ernments. The immediate implication of such state restriction and 
ultimately devastation is to redistribute wealth upwards. The point, 
explicitly articulated by neoconservative pundits and neoliberal pro-
ponents, including politicians, is to put more wealth into the hands 
of the already wealthy. Expenditures of the wealthy (largely on them-
selves), the public is repeatedly told, are supposed to trickle down 
into jobs for the less well off. (Foreign policy is fueled by the same 
logic.) But the mission, as much as any, is also to elevate the decision-
making, social engineering, and effective powers of the well off. The 
social effect of state emaciation, accordingly, is not that social spending 
should end completely. Rather, in being redirected into private hands, 
it is fashioned by and for the social and political interests of those with 
capital to spare.
The elevated factions of social class in traditional racial states (the 
U.S. and South Africa are prime examples) have traditionally been 
white, or more precisely representing the interests of those occupying 
the structural class position of whiteness (and maleness). The U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau reports that in 2000 the top five percent of white wage earn-
ers received wages almost double those of the top five percent of black 
wage earners. Unsurprisingly, the largest contributors by far to politi-
cal campaigns are white men. Under this mandate of radical priva-
tization, funded institutions and activities become dramatically less 
diverse in their programming, scope, commitments, and, notably, in 
their employment patterns. Given that the language of race itself—not 
just as an organizing principle of the state but as an analytic category 
for social critique—is being eroded and erased, it becomes increasingly 
difficult, if not impossible, to sustain a critical focus on the pernicious 
effects of this restructuring.
I am suggesting that race is a key structuring technology not just of 
modern state formation but also, more contemporarily, of neoliberal-
ism as the driving condition of late modern capitalist state formation. 
Neoliberalism represents the shift from a caretaker or pastoral state of 
welfare capitalism to a “traffic cop” or “minimal” state, ordering flows 
of capital, people, goods, public services, and information. In diluting, 
if not erasing, race in all public affairs of the state, neoliberal propo-
nents nevertheless seek to privatize race alongside most everything 
else. Categories of race disappear from statistical ledgers of discrimi-
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nation, thus leaving untouched the condition they are supposed to 
articulate, to mark and express as well as identify and assess. Devoid 
of race in the public sphere, racism—as modes of racially driven exclu-
sion, debilitation, and humiliation—is freed to circulate as robustly as 
individuals or non-government (or non-government funded) institu-
tions choose in private.
IV. Managing Heterogeneity
Throughout modernity, race fashioned inclusion and exclusion, order-
ing demographic diversity and shaping population heterogeneity to 
the reproduced benefit of those structurally in power, invariably iden-
tified in the racial scheme as white. With neoliberalism, race is purged 
from the lexicon of public administrative arrangements and assess-
ments while remaining robust and unaddressed in the private realm. 
One can ask, then, how heterogeneity and its challenges are managed 
under neoliberal conditions of racial privatization.
At the center of neoliberal commitments is the principle that people 
should be free to express and exercise their preferences as they see 
fit. Since preference expression throughout modernity has been, to a 
greater or lesser degree, formulated in racial terms, preference expres-
sion and its products continue to carry racial weight. Cultural prefer-
ences, for instance, remain to a considerable extent racially predictable, 
as expressed by what music members of racially ascribed groups tend 
to listen to, what sports they prefer to play or watch, and so on. At the 
interfaces, this can be the cause of some tension, if not friction. It thus 
requires some massaging, if not persistent management. Accordingly, 
the two primary modalities of such racial management are mixture, on 
the one hand, and duress and invasive violence, on the other.
A. Racial Mixing
Free choice is best informed and exercised through interactions with 
others, through the free flow of commerce checked and bounded only 
by the security of agents and their social arrangements. Preferences, 
after all, can only be successfully expressed and exercised in secure 
environments. Certainly commerce thrives when people can interact 
and mix. On this account, mixture is considered to express and expand 
market possibilities (not unbounded mixture, to be sure, which can spi-
ral out of control, but mixture subject to well-established controls long 
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set in place and bounded by racial presumptions about merit, excel-
lence, and beauty, taken as unquestioned givens). Racial mixing may 
be desirable, but its product, while inflecting determining inputs from 
each of the ingredients, is exhorted ultimately to mimic the cultural 
and performative standards of those embodying historical power—in 
short, of whiteness.
Brazil is often considered the exemplar. Brazilians use varying terms 
in differing circumstances to make polite reference to people often as 
lighter or, more occasionally in disparaging terms, as darker than they 
are in fact. This preference indicates a desire for what whiteness sym-
bolically represents, if not for whiteness itself. It is not unlike what was 
expressed by the young schoolchildren in Brown versus Board of Edu-
cation (1954) in the U.S. context. This way of characterizing the matter 
presupposes some objectivity, some fixity, to the racial palette.
Another way of looking at this color flexibility is to tie it less to the 
“actual” color of a person, whatever that might mean or however it 
might be fixed, and more to a rhetoric of social characterization as 
racially understood. Thus, terms for “lighter” mark the referent in the 
speaker’s eyes (even when it is self-characterizing) as appealing or vir-
tuous, while terms that are characteristically associated with darkness 
mark their target as the opposite. Livio Sansone reports that his visibly 
darker survey respondents in Bahia often refer to parents and partners 
by way of terms indicating lighter colors than appearance seems to 
suggest. Those who are wealthier would also more likely be desig-
nated by lighter color terms than those who are not.
Here the syntax of racial terms effect a semantic field the signifi-
cance of which is more in their meaning-making than in any claim 
to the reductive objectivity of their referentiality. By casting this as a 
tendency, I am not suggesting that racial reference in Brazil has come 
completely unglued from color assumptions about referents, only that 
these connections are not as fast and fixed as racial characterization 
traditionally (pre)tends to presume.
Making blacks and blackness if not invisible then less definitive 
in the national self-identification and imaginary means that mixing 
effects two contradictory if complementary political dynamics. For 
one, it makes it far more difficult for those marked as black, as Afri-
can descended, to organize politically around that self-understanding. 
If the nation sees itself as mixed (if lured heavily by Euro-mimesis, 
ethno-racially understood), then emphasizing blackness as the grounds 
for political organizing flies in the face of national personality, of the 
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being of the nation itself. It is seen as a retreat, as reactionary, as need-
less recourse to an ancien regime of race, and so as verging on racism 
itself. Denial of blackness and indigeneity as categories, character(s), or 
cultures undermines the possibility of launching a recognizable coun-
termovement. At the same time, mixing (mestizaje/mesticagem in the 
Latin American context) as metonym for Euro-mimesis has tended to 
render blacks as the unwanted, as the national familia’s black sheep, the 
patria’s illegitimate child.
If a whitening mixture is actually or effectively the official mandate 
and domineering (though not altogether dominating) discourse, then 
Indians (mostly) and blacks (a little less so) become inputs in the cal-
culator of mixture. This suggests the inputs themselves are not fixed 
in place but assume some fluidity, more so historically in the case of 
Indians than blacks. This instability, stabilized only in the mixed prod-
uct, makes almost any organization ordered around the terms of input 
difficult, though not impossible. For one thing, the input categories 
themselves are kept unstable, with people dropping in and out of them 
depending on personal circumstances, prospects, relationships, and 
social relations more broadly. For another, such organizing is largely 
reactive, and requires considerable conscience- and consciousness-
raising simply to enable the conditions of conceptual possibility for 
the organization to emerge. The volatility and motility of ethno-racial 
definitions undermine the stability necessary for longer term politi-
cal effect, exacerbated, as they often have been, by globally dominant 
institutions and state powers for geopolitical and, lately, neoliberal 
purposes.
Throughout Latin America, mestizaje was married with blanquea-
miento, or whitening, the pairing presided over by Euro-mimesis and 
consummated by racial democracy as national commitment. In the lon-
ger analysis, the marriage stabilized whiteness at the sufferance of any 
potential competitors. The conjugation of mixture and Euro-mimesis 
extends the political power of whiteness as the prevailing structural 
condition of any racially heterogeneous society through the applica-
tion of the general principles in and to other local circumstances.
In the name of progressing beyond race, mixing deeply reinscribes 
the traditional assumptions not just of racial identification, but of 
racial derogation, denigration, and denial—in short, of racisms. Since 
the 1980s, various social scientists have demonstrated deep racial 
disparities on almost every significant social index (life expectancy, 
income, education, employment, residential access, infant mortality, 
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incarceration) in societies robustly marked by racial mixture and by 
(post)colonial histories of racism (most notably but far from only in 
Brazil). Yet even as it proves to be a distraction from these indices, 
racial mixtures reinforce the skewed social conditions represented by 
race, drawing critical attention away from, and leaving pretty much in 
place, the traditional structures of racial debilitation.
At the same time, blanquiamiento as a policy of whitening undercuts 
the lure of “passing,” so much part of the lore of the United States and 
to a lesser degree of South Africa. If one can “whiten up,” so to speak, 
by a mix of intercoursing, cultural and even moral mestizaje—indeed, 
where “enlightening” mestizaje is projected and promoted as national 
character, as aspiration—the pull of passing would seem to be largely 
moot. Mestizaje, one might say, is passing made more or less legitimate, 
manageable, more or less livable (envy and resentment, disdain and 
denial notwithstanding).
In short, Latin America indicates the ways in which racial mixture is 
structured in favor of presumptive whiteness as the measure of merit. 
It signals the direction of racism(s), the silenced but still gripping 
debilitations, under the normalizing constraints of neoliberal commit-
ments to deregulation and de-unionization, privatization and indi-
vidualization, reduction in public services, and maximization of free 
trade. Mixing accordingly offers the mode and metaphor for fixing in 
place traditional structures and relations of racially conceived power. 
Mixing is able to work its way in states legible to the forces of global 
political economy, those states willing and capable of regulating their 
debt, reducing public expenditures, and sustaining economic growth.
Mixing in this way offers one of the principal ways of regulating 
heterogeneity in different social circumstances, globally configured. 
Understood in this way, mixing establishes the horizon of possibility, 
the limits for heterogeneity, while making it seem as though there are 
no limits. Sometimes people, even whole populations, refuse to be 
bound by these constraints, refuse to subject themselves to the disci-
pline of debt regulation and structural adjustment, to denationaliza-
tion and state restriction—in short, refuse to give up their compelling 
identifications for the sake of greasing neoliberalism’s tracks. Then 
more invasive technologies of control are invoked by the traffic-cop 
state. The force of flows becomes more assertive.
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B. Racial Duress: Violence
“Rogue states” are those states that have “proved” for a variety of rea-
sons that they cannot be controlled or managed by the “soft hand” of 
debt regulation and structural adjustment in the new global scheme of 
neoliberalism. These are the sort of states identified by George Bush as 
representing the “axis of evil” (Iran, Iraq, North Korea) as well as Syria, 
Palestine, Venezuela, and Cuba. If the Euro-mimesis at the heart of 
racial mixture holds out to those engaged in the mixing the possibility 
of entering even a diminished whiteness, then rogue states are states 
(if properly states at all) of various sorts of non-whiteness, structurally 
understood, of anti-whiteness—which is to say, anti-Americanism. In 
short, they are states of reconfigured racial definition.
These states represent a more radical difference or otherness than 
those states properly plugged into the neoliberal global network of 
robust and unrestricted trade, free markets, and exploitable labor forces 
and natural resources. Their management logically requires a greater 
degree of invasiveness, of the imposition of duress or violence to con-
trol, than those states where intercourse is considered more appealing. 
Falling outside the reach of control through commerce, debt regulation, 
and structural adjustment, they are subjected to increasingly invasive 
measures of control, their supposed racial distinction opening them to 
external imposition, restraint, and ultimately violence.
This, then, suggests a new modality of occupying or potentially 
occupying state formation made possible conceptually by the projec-
tion of permanent racial infantilization, humiliation, or what I have 
elsewhere called “philistinianization.” Palestine offers the most obvi-
ous example. It has been marked as the first “permanently-temporary” 
state, to use Eyal Weizman’s incisive characterization. State boundaries 
are rendered impermanent, flexible according to the occupier’s needs 
and whimsical determinations, visible only to the day’s militarized 
cartographic dictates. Permanent impermanence is made the marker of 
the very ethno-racial condition of the Palestinian, and through the Pal-
estinian to the possibility of the Arab as such. Although Lebanon is the 
latest case in the transformation from the neoliberal political economy 
of debt creation and regulation to the necropolitical by disciplining 
an otherwise unruly population through the threat of immediate and 
painful death, Palestine has embodied this form more or less since 
1982. Palestine is the laboratory case for neoliberal regulation through 
aggression and violence.
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Hamas and Hizbullah have been widely characterized recently 
as “states within states,” in good part because of the services they 
offer, the sense of militarist self-defense they have self-consciously 
constructed, and the loyal following they have conjured. While there 
is a sense to this, it is overly simplistic and predicates the picture as 
a contrast and competitor to “legitimate” and conventional state for-
mations. It is more compelling to understand both as representing 
robust, organized responses from the realm of civil society to the sort 
of state demise and destruction that an aggressive, militarized neolib-
eralism has signaled for those state formations not passing its test for 
legitimacy. In this sense, such organizations are less competitors than 
complements to states shirking their longer-standing caretaker com-
mitments in favor of their purely repressive functions. The Sadrists 
have recently announced a similar undertaking to establish services 
throughout Iraq for inhabitants of all affiliations failing to receive sup-
port from a state close to perishing.
The Palestinian in this conceptual scheme stands for one always 
between, always ill-at-ease, homeless at home if never at home in his 
homelessness. He is the explicit embodiment of Levinas’s facelessness: 
shifting, shiftless, unreliable, untrustworthy, nowhere to go, nowhere 
to be, the persona of negativity, of negation, of death’s potential. He is 
the quintessential Nobody, as Memmi characterizes the figure of the 
colonized, the embodiment of enmity, almost already dead. The ter-
ritory of the state, at any rate, is multiply divisible, broadly between 
three islands but more locally between multiplying settlements, both 
overlooking and cutting off one local population from another. Indeed, 
the determination of the local, of who belongs and who does not, of the 
very meaning of occupier, is being rendered increasingly and deliber-
ately ambiguous, doubtful. Possession is nine-tenths of belonging, of 
being, to twist a cliché.
This self-estrangement, this unheimlich homelessness, is instrumen-
talized through the elevation of the state’s security apparatus as the 
primary mode of governmental rationality and instrumentality. The 
main modalities of the terrorizing state today include targeted assas-
sinations, expulsions, threatened deportations, “collateral damage,” 
perpetual imprisonments, and “preventive” detentions under the most 
trying conditions, accompanied by incessant provocations. Emergent 
leadership and political elites are constrained, if not killed. Proliferat-
ing checkpoints make Palestinian movement all but impossible, pain-
fully snail paced, and they make life miserable. Access especially to 
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and within city centers is open and closed according to the calculations 
of security risks, military movements, and political whim. The popula-
tion is economically and politically isolated, starved of the means to 
even a modicum of stable social life. Access to work and workplaces, 
hospitals, and education is severely restricted. The availability of food, 
medicine, and other basic necessities is carefully managed and manip-
ulated. People die daily as much from debilitation as from bullets in 
numbers that do not show up on the daily roster of the dead.
The territory of the targeted population is reduced to a state of 
perpetual siege through closure and curfews, encirclement and sanc-
tions, invasion and repression. Walls are erected, barriers go up, gates 
are locked, roads blocked, access denied. All critical opposition and 
any cross-societal solidarity are rendered unpatriotic, their “perpetra-
tors” considered traitorous and treacherous, subject to the high crime 
of treason, and they can be incarcerated without trial. Ornery organic 
leaders are marginalized or “disappeared” by one means or another, 
their replacements handpicked in the name of a democracy promised 
or imposed. “We want you to choose your leaders, only not him. Or 
him. Or him…That one will be good so long as he has been trained 
in the West, one of us, understands our ways, is on our payroll.” It 
is democracy for the damned, but not of them, as the response to the 
Hamas electoral victory has more than amply evidenced. If this is 
the prevailing racial modality for Palestinians, it is not restricted to 
them, or to assertion only by Israel. As Monica McAlister has remarked 
regarding the United States, the point has been not merely to support 
Israel in its “palestinianizing” ventures, “to act with them,” but to 
emulate Israel in circumstances deemed similar, “to act like them” vis-
à-vis the Middle East and Muslims, and perhaps more generally (i.e., 
Venezuela, Cuba). It just may be that we are all potentially Palestinians 
today. But is the potential for “philistinianizing” in each of us, too?
These forms of repression sooner or later prompt resistance from 
those subjugated and repressed by their measures. Resistance takes 
many forms, ranging from lack of cooperation to suicide bombings. 
The modes of resistance most likely to show some success concern 
themselves with building a more sustained coalitional movement, 
across ethno-racial distinction and class, national boundaries and reli-
gion, gender and generation. Even when targeted “surgical” strikes 
are ordered, resistance might emerge at great risk, as in Lebanon when 
Israel invaded in the summer of 2006, or when Palestinian women in 
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Gaza bandied together to surround a Hamas house the Israeli military 
was targeting for air strikes.
Neoliberal jurisdiction thus conjures a set of racisms in which mix-
ture constitutes the national imagination, the (self-)image of the nation. 
Tanned whiteness and Euro-mimesis become national embodiments. 
The frivolity and conviviality of carnival and soccer/golf/surfing/skiing 
become its coloring of culture while the whitening of class elevation 
and the blackening of impoverishment become its ends. The racial 
structuring of life’s possibilities and delimitations for those who do not 
“fit”—ultimately the violent rearrangement and disruption of the con-
ditions of life and death itself—are unspoken.
V. Cordial Racism
The delicate link between racelessness and racism, mixture and vio-
lence, that neoliberal social arrangements forge is revealed most tell-
ingly by the notion of racismo cordial (“cordial racism”). Cordial racism 
offers an illuminating conceptual summary of raceless racism’s logic, 
neoliberally licensed. The concept of cordial racism explicates exclu-
sion or devaluation, though in terms carefully and self-consciously 
race-neutral. It is a mannered racism (even exaggeratedly mannerist), 
behavior by the book, racism knowingly in denial. The denial can 
assume two forms. The first claims that I cannot be racist (saying or 
doing something racist) because it is not in me, I am not intending it, 
how should or could I have known it to be racist…What I have said or 
done is not directed at any individual, and in any case I have treated 
you as I would anyone in such circumstances.
The other form is to deny that I intend anything mean: It’s just a 
joke. I say these things about all kinds of people (races, genders, people 
from other parts of the country, indeed, even about members of my 
own group). A recently popular song in Brazil characterized a black 
woman as “stinking like a skunk.” In the uproar that followed, the 
song was banned and the singer charged with racism, now a felonious 
crime in Brazil. This led one comedian to quip dismissively that, “It is 
natural that people stink, independently of their race.”
Here, curiously, the claim to equalize meanness serves to negate 
in two related ways. It is a negation, first and obviously, of the spe-
cific wrong—racism—directed at this target. Secondly, it is a failure 
to recognize, to comprehend, the ways in which traditional victims of 
racism (almost invariably shades of black-brown or black-associated 
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people) are targeted over and over. It fails to consider how this par-
ticular targeting at this time reinforces the accumulated targeting (both 
historically and contemporarily), exacerbates the vulnerability, reiter-
ates the charge of inferiority, sanctifies exclusion, and concretizes and 
repeatedly cements in place the group’s or individual’s marginaliza-
tion through humiliation. That is in fact how everyday racism works, 
as Philomena Essed has demonstrated so effectively.
So “cordial racism” as a concept softens the edge of structural degra-
dation racially ordered—in and for any society structured-in-whiteness. 
Racial reference vaporizes into the very air we breath. The informalities 
of racismo cordial have seeped across the world, the shadow condition 
of whiteness. It has blinded the privileged to the debilitations of life’s 
conditions, possibilities, and prospects, racially predicated. They can-
not see the foreshortening of life itself, racially indexed, or the drudg-
ery racially doubled in the name of individual decency, privatized 
effort, and personal cordiality.
The state, as might be expected, offers little counterweight here. 
The pressure of neoliberal global institutions (the World Bank, IMF, 
multinational corporate investment and bank loans, etc.) to denation-
alize and to privatize key institutions intensifies as states intervene to 
redress past inequities or to render economic distribution more equi-
table. So the state remains the nemesis of civil society and its social 
movements, and continues to provide little if any prospect for even 
identifying, let alone curtailing, racisms rather than prompting new 
modalities of their expression.
Cordial racism trades on race without naming it as such. If there 
is no race, there can be no racial harm—so no racism. Evaporation 
alchemizes the structural into the individual, the pernicious into the 
cordial, the public behind the veil of ignorant privacy, racisms into 
the virtues of mixed race (mestizaje/mesticagem). Mergence is emer-
gence from the chilling fog of race into denial, the left behind, the 
new untouchable, the shadow of the shadow. We no longer need to do 
anything about racism, for there is nothing to do. And there is noth-
ing to do because the index to the condition no longer exists. It is no 
longer thinkable, so no longer to be bothered about. A new day. Race is 
so…yesterday, racism so…not us.
The racisms resurrected by neoliberal virtualization are racisms 
denuded of their conceptual referents. In their mutedness, they are rac-
isms unspoken yet unapologetic. Cordial to the bitter end.
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Racial evaporation prompts racial skepticism. It prompts skepti-
cism of the very wrongs being claimed to offend in the first instance. 
Where’s the offense? How bad can it be? The offense, if admitted, is 
less about the exclusions, inequities, or iniquities prompted by the 
racial characterization so much as it is an offense against society as 
such for invoking the offending term to begin with. The harm identi-
fied is less to the individual or group who have consequently suffered 
loss than to the society for having to deal with the nonsense of race 
itself. Can we just get over it, ignore it, will it into oblivion as though 
it never existed and left no legacy? It once marked individuals, to be 
sure, but now it has (and should have) no reference point, no measure, 
no determination.
It is often remarked consequently that, in general, racism is the 
product of ignorance. Not knowing better, whether on the part of indi-
viduals or institutions, leads to discriminatory expression, to deroga-
tory reference, to failing to address social issues, to the all too easy 
possibility of ignoring problems because they aren’t identified to begin 
with. Racism also makes possible the not asking, the failure to collect 
data, the grounds for ignoring the invisible, and, by extension, the 
refusal to address deep social inequities which aren’t recognized as 
iniquitous precisely because they are not recognized at all. Racism, in 
short, is as much cause as effect.
VI. Conclusion
The conceptual and material conditions and implications, effects and 
challenges of raceless racisms, of racist informalisms and individualiza-
tion, of mannered racisms and racial avoidance amount, in short, to the 
complex of neoliberalizing racisms. The expansive, almost horizonless 
proliferation of racially significant, inflected, or suggestive terms glob-
ally distributed (many with shifting meanings not only across space 
and time but from one user or user-group to another) speaks to the 
complexity of racial arrangements. Yet it refers also to the varieties and 
range of racial investment.
We can see exemplified here the more or less informal identification 
of race with class formation. Whiteness on this score amounts to the 
structural condition identified with relative wealth, education, social 
privilege, standing, access, and advancement. Blackness structurally, 
by contrast, can be conceived as exclusion or restriction on these indi-
ces. Individuals being elevated along these dimensions are taken to be 
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white(r), to be “whitening up.” It is also the case that the line of argu-
ment followed here reveals how the otherwise attractive celebration 
of mixture threatens to draw attention away from the materialities of 
racial injustices, of the debilitating exclusions produced and effected 
by racisms.
It follows that the individualizing of discrimination and exclusion, 
and the slipperiness as well as ghost-like quality of racial terms, make 
it an often thankless, even burdensome task to point out racist discrim-
ination. Critics of racisms are viewed as akin to whistleblowers and 
often treated analogously—as spoil sports, or paranoid, or just plain 
delusional, seeing wrong by invoking terms the prevailing social order 
claims to reject. Racist exclusions accordingly become unreferenced 
even as they permeate sociality. They are often unrecognizable because 
society lacks the terms of characterization or engagement. When rec-
ognizable, however, they are more often than not in deep denial—the 
ghost in the machine of neoliberal sociality.
There are two further considerations barely discernible in the pre-
ceding line of analysis. The history of racial configuration is profoundly 
linked in its emergence, elaboration, and expression, to death and vio-
lence, variously articulated. Fred Moten has noted that black social life 
is one angled towards death, both physical and social. Blackness, his-
torically conceived, is “being-towards-death.” One could perhaps gen-
eralize the point without diminishing the particular and quite pressing 
exemplification of the principle embodied in the modern histories of 
blackness. The intense modern experience of any group that has been 
conjured principally as the object of racial configuration will find its 
sense of self mediated, if not massaged and managed—in short, threat-
ened—through its relation to death. What traces do the voluminous 
legacies of racially prompted death and violence leave in the making 
and making over, the remaking, of racially marked communities imag-
ining themselves anew?
Different “minoritized” groups react to this mediation in differ-
ent ways. For Jews, the slogan “Never Again,” articulated by Emil 
Fackenheim as the 614th biblical commandment, internalizes a vigi-
lant aggressiveness expressed as survival at almost any cost. Radical 
Muslim political theology rationalizes the violence of its response to 
what Philomena Essed revealingly identifies as humiliation in terms of 
the lure of a liberatory reward in the afterlife. American Indians suffer 
the liquidation of their interests, first in the melancholy of disaffected 
sociality and in some regional states more recently in the turn to con-
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ventional electoral politics. Blacks respond variously to their persistent 
minority status and repeated (often spotlighted) invisibility. One type 
of response includes a turn to an insistent visibility of cultural perfor-
mance, sometimes celebrating a counter-violence in the wake of a per-
sistent challenge to self-confidence. Another reaction is racially driven 
political organizing, by assimilating or integrating as best as conditions 
allow, or (as in the case of Latin America) by an effort to amalgamate 
through mixing. All responses have decidedly varying results. In each 
instance, the valence of death lingers, if only as a negative dialectic, 
modulating the inevitable melancholy or aggressiveness vying for the 
sense and sensibility the group comes to have of itself.
Virtually every dominant structural or policy response by the state 
to this relational, racially inscribed “being-towards-death” that insists 
on what I have characterized as Euro-mimesis once more “minori-
tizes” the contributions and concerns of the historically “diminutized” 
and devalued. These responses thus reinscribe the racially excluded 
as secondary social citizens, as burdens of state largesse. The state 
suppresses their contributions in their own right to state formation or 
social reconstruction while silencing the terms of reference for even 
registering such contributions. In short, they offer both the precursor 
and perfect exemplification of neoliberal commitment to consumption 
sans the source of production, to pleasure denuded of guilt, excess 
unrestricted by constraint, fabrication unanchored from fact.
Anti-racist social movements mobilize for greater social recognition, 
access, equality, and protection from discrimination when focused on 
race as the principal organizing feature. They will more likely succeed 
in enabling greater recognition than produce any significant material 
benefits or dramatic social improvements, as Michael Hanchard has 
demonstrated in the case of Brazil’s Moviemiento Negro. Vigorous access, 
equality, and diminished discrimination require ongoing, relentless, 
scaled social challenge and change around residential improvements 
and interraciality, significantly better educational opportunities from 
the earliest age, steady employment, and public recognition and gen-
eral enforcement of the importance of antidiscrimination regimes. The 
ongoing tensions between anti-racist transformation, racelessness, 
socio-class divisions, persistent debilitations, and variations on the 
devastations of everyday life reveal in their ambivalence and ambigu-
ity the enormous challenges to face down a half millennium of periodi-
cally renewed racial rule. •
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